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DISAGGREGATIVE MECHANISMS: MASS CLAIMS 
RESOLUTION WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS 
Jaime Dodge∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Aggregation has long been viewed as the primary, if not sole, vehicle for 
mass claims resolution. For a half century, scholars have consistently viewed 
the consolidated litigation of similar claims as the only mechanism for 
efficiently resolving mass claims. In this Article, I challenge that long-standing 
and fundamental assumption. This Article seeks to reconceptualize our 
understanding of mass claims resolution, arguing that we are witnessing the 
birth of a second, unexplored branch of mass claims resolution mechanisms—
which I term “disaggregative” dispute resolution systems because they lack 
the traditional judicial aggregation of victims that has been the hallmark of 
mass claims litigation.  
Disaggregation returns to a focus on the individual akin to that of the 
single-plaintiff system, but uses either procedural or substantive streamlining, 
or a shift of costs to the defendant, to ameliorate the asymmetries that 
prompted the creation of class actions. Many of our most innovative claims 
structures—from the BP Gulf Coast Claims Fund and the fund created in the 
wake of the Costa Concordia disaster, to the common single-plaintiff 
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment agreements—use this new, 
bottom-up model of disaggregative mass claims resolution instead of the 
familiar top-down aggregative model. 
These next-generation systems have been heralded as a significant 
advancement in mass claims resolution, capable of awarding greater 
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litigation. But like the single-plaintiff and aggregate litigation systems that 
preceded it, disaggregation has its flaws. Because the defendant typically 
designs these systems, they often give rise to questions about legitimacy and 
the accuracy of compensation. Yet, because these systems are the product of 
contract, attempts to restrict them have largely failed. This Article tees up not 
only the problem these privately ordered processes are creating for the 
enforcement of traditional public mechanisms of aggregation, but also the 
problems with the public system that drove the private demand for 
disaggregation. The Responses to this Article published in the remainder of 
this colloquy begin to explore the consequences of this new approach to mass 
claims and the array of potential public mechanisms for bringing aggregation 
and disaggregation into balance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aggregation was arguably the single most important procedural innovation 
of the past century.1 It held the promise of remedying previously irremediable 
harms;2 it was the device to which we entrusted our most important cases, from 
catastrophic mass torts like Agent Orange3 and asbestos,4 to the school 
desegregation of Brown v. Board of Education5 and the quest for workplace 
equality.6 Yet, if aggregation was the innovation of the past century, what 
could be the innovation of this century? 
In recent years, we have increasingly sought to resolve our nation’s greatest 
tragedies and harms without aggregate litigation. In the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks, Congress created the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund for the express purpose of removing cases from the traditional litigation 
system—insulating the airlines from the costs of defense and streamlining the 
costs of public funds dissemination through the creation of a non–Article III 




 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 
913 (1998) (“Perhaps the most dramatic development in civil procedure in recent decades has been the growth 
of interest in the class action . . . .”); accord John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort 
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344–45, 1350 (1995); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters 
and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979). 
 
2
 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that the emergence of aggregate 
litigation through Rule 23 was largely an attempt to vindicate “the rights of groups of people who individually 
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all” (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A 
Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 
3
 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
4
 Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591. 
 
5
 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 
6
 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 
7
 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006). For similar 
programs, see Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. §§ 239–239h (2006) 
(Smallpox Compensation Program); Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, id. §§ 247d-6d to -6e 
(Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program); Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, id. § 2210 
(Radiation Exposure Compensation Program); Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976, id. §§ 3796–
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litigation, as exemplified most prominently by the BP Gulf Coast Claims Fund 
(GCCF) created in the wake of Deepwater Horizon’s explosion.8 
But companies do not only bypass aggregation in addressing national 
tragedies and mass disasters. Increasingly, companies seek to avoid 
aggregation before and after more ordinary disputes arise as well. With the 
Supreme Court’s blessing, companies have begun to include arbitration clauses 
as a predispute mechanism for precluding aggregation, ensuring individual 
processing of employment9 and small-value consumer claims.10 Putative 
defendants have also adopted mass compensation schemes to resolve contract 
and mass tort cases, ranging from disputes over seats at the Super Bowl to the 
running aground of the Costa Concordia cruise ship, in a postdispute effort to 
prevent or weaken postdispute aggregation.11 
Yet our scholarship continues to conceive of mass claims resolution 
through the lens of aggregate litigation—class actions and, in recent years, 
multidistrict litigation and “quasi–class action” settlements.12 As a 
 
3796c-2 (Supp. 2008) (Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program); Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 1989b-3 (2006). 
 
8
 For the official website, see http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com. Although BP would ultimately 
reach a class action settlement approved in 2012, it resolved more than two-thirds of its claims—more than 
$7.8 billion—through a private claims resolution facility, as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. See 33 
U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012). In the wake of the class action settlement, the GCCF website was closed, directing 




 See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (remanding noncompete claims to 
arbitration); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (enforcing a provision giving an arbitrator 
authority to determine all challenges to enforceability of an arbitration agreement between employee and 
employer, in the context of a race discrimination claim). 
 
10
 See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (holding a dispute over $257 in 
credit card fees was properly subject to arbitration because the statute created a right to proceed in class action 
litigation but was silent as to whether claims could proceed in arbitration, and thus did not override the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s presumption of arbitrability); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) 
(holding a $30 dispute was properly subject to a single-plaintiff arbitration agreement). 
 
11
 For discussion, see infra Part II.B. 
 
12
 When federal civil actions pending in different districts have common questions of fact, multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) is utilized to combine and transfer the actions to any district for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). The new trend within the scholarship has been toward the recognition 
of quasi–class action settlement structures through MDL as contrasted with traditional class actions; yet both 
mechanisms fall within the traditional conception of aggregation. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1274–75 (2012); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 370, 371 (2000); Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 962–63 (2012); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of 
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 110–11 (2010). 
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consequence, many of these innovations are dismissed as ad hoc responses to 
extraordinary situations.13 
I argue that a far more fundamental transition is underway: We are 
witnessing the birth of an entirely new branch of nonaggregative mass claims 
resolution systems, of which these mechanisms are mere exemplars. 
These emerging systems are based upon a wholly different dispute 
resolution methodology than those described in the existing literature—one 
that bypasses the determination of common questions, at the core of aggregate 
mechanisms, entirely.14 Instead, these mechanisms use individualized claims 
determination as the vehicle for mass claims resolution.15 I therefore term this 
new, second, unexplored branch of mass claims resolution mechanisms 
“disaggregative” dispute resolution systems. While “disaggregation” has 
typically referred to the breaking down of an aggregate class into smaller 
subclasses,16 this Article posits a far more radical form of disaggregation, in 
which the would-be class is broken into individual claims. The consequences 




 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Introduction to Symposium, Remedies for Big Disasters: The BP Gulf Oil 
Spill and the Quest for Complete Justice, 45 AKRON L. REV. 567, 570 (2012) (summarizing the conclusion of 
symposium participants that the GCCF should not serve as a template for other disasters or compensation 
programs); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1114, 1118 (2010) (attributing 
the lack of scholarship on public funds to the conception that they are “sui generis” products of “special 
legislation”). 
For studies of particular tribunals, see KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE 
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005); Robert M. Ackerman, The September 
11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 135 (2005); Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 
VA. L. REV. 1831 (2002); Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public Fund: 
Transparency and Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 255 (2011). 
 
14
 Leading scholars are now focused upon doctrinal trends within aggregation toward smaller classes and 
multidistrict litigation—what I suggest here is a far more fundamental shift in mass claims resolution. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013) (discussing the trend toward 
smaller classes); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial By Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2012). 
 
15
 See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 
1380–81 (2005) (“Except for the option of individual trials, all of the currently available litigation procedures 
for an endgame in disputes involving large numbers of claims contemplate a claims resolution facility. [Rule 
23 federal class actions], state class actions, bankruptcy, multidistrict litigation, and mass settlements all reach 
closure with a claims resolution facility.”). 
 
16
 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 93 (2011) (using the term “disaggregation” to reference 
the Dukes Court’s insistence on smaller classes and Concepcion’s upholding of predispute arbitration 
provisions that effectively barred aggregation, noting that both opinions “insisted on disaggregation, 
devolution, and privatization”). 
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different set of normative concerns than the more restricted form of 
disaggregation occurring within the public aggregation mechanisms.17 
The public class action device contributed to “a sea change in our 
understanding of both substantive and procedural law,”18 generating an entirely 
new field of legal scholarship.19 The rise of private disaggregation has the 
potential to create an equally dramatic shift in the legal landscape, as this new 
approach to dispute resolution is driving many of the most innovative claims 
structures emerging today.20 
In the mass claims context, individual plaintiffs often lack the incentive to 
bring suit, and where they do bring suit, they often rationally underinvest in 
litigation compared to the defendant.21 This resource asymmetry led to the 
creation of aggregation mechanisms, but created a new set of undesirable 
results, from nuisance suits to sweetheart deals.22 Disaggregative mechanisms 
are thus a next-generation attempt to correct the resource asymmetries of the 
single-plaintiff era, without generating the familiar problems of aggregation. 
Disaggregative systems often streamline procedure or substantive inquiries, 
or shift the costs of litigation to the defendants, allowing the pursuit of claims 
that could not rationally be pursued in the pre–Rule 23 world because the 




 See infra Part II. 
 
18
 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 914. 
 
19
 Id. at 914–16 & n.2 (querying whether any law review existed that had not published an article on 
class actions and providing an excellent index of the leading works within the field).  
 
20
 For a traditional discussion of disaggregation as a mechanism for effectuating global class settlement, 
see Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 751 (2002) (discussing the asbestos, silicone gel breast implant, and fen-phen class settlements, 
which he noted “all aspire to create some form of private administrative system that . . . promises more 




 See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory 
Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1859–60 (2004). 
 
22
 See infra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN 
A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 11–54 (2007) (discussing the dynamics of mass tort litigation and dysfunctions that 
arise in this context). 
 
23
 See infra Part III.A. Effective in 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set the 
prerequisites for class certification, as well as the types of classes permitted and their respective requirements. 
1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:8, at 28–29 (4th ed. 2002). The 
accompanying advisory committee notes explained the rationale for this innovation, focusing largely on the 
risk of inconsistent judgments and the need for classwide relief in discrimination cases. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 98–102 (1966).  
But, today’s class action practice focuses far more on these cost asymmetries, which can prevent either 
the pursuit of a claim or the successful pursuit of a claim. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class 
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for the aggregation of claims; each individual can autonomously decide 
whether to pursue relief or not. This structure has the consequence of removing 
the agency relationship inherent to class litigation24—and with it the 
substantial costs aggregation entails,25 allowing the settlement of cases that 
could not be certified for class treatment consistent with due process.26 
As a result, these features of disaggregation create the possibility for 
claimants not only to receive compensation more quickly but also to receive 
more compensation than would have been available in aggregation.27 Yet, even 
where this supercompensation is offered, defendants may see a decrease in 
overall costs, as litigation costs and free riding decline.28 Thus, disaggregation 
holds the laudable promise of a simultaneous, superior, win-win outcome for 
both parties by eliminating the systemic costs and delays inherent to aggregate 
litigation—suggesting that these mechanisms may become a more common 
feature in our legal system in the years to come.29 
But it is already foreseeable that disaggregation will also generate a new set 
of deviations from our preferred outcomes, like the single-plaintiff and 
aggregate litigation structures that preceded it.30 While aggregation is often 
described as one of the most controversial features of our litigation system, 
 
Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 852–53 (2002). For an excellent 
introduction for the unfamiliar reader to the phases of class litigation and the settlement pressures and 
“dysfunctions” apparent at each phase of litigation, see generally NAGAREDA, supra note 22, at 11–54.  
 
24
 See Burch, supra note 12, at 1274–81 (discussing agency problems in both class actions and MDL and 
the possibility of third-party financiers acting as monitors in the context of nonclass aggregative litigation to 
help manage principal–agent problems); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1991) (discussing agency in the context of Rule 23 class litigation and the agency costs 
unique to aggregate litigation). See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of 
Agency Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561 (2014) (discussing the agency costs inherent in 
representative actions and the potential impact of alternative litigation financing).  
 
25
 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (noting that the transaction costs 
exceeded recovery in the asbestos cases by a two-to-one ratio). 
 
26
 See id. at 597–98 (holding the class settlement proposing global resolution of current and future claims 
could not be certified consistent with due process, but noting that lack of certification meant that “future 
claimants may lose altogether” given the specter of exhaustion of assets). 
 
27
 See infra Part II.B. 
 
28
 See infra Part II.C. 
 
29
 Cf. John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1441, 1444–57 (2005) (discussing distrust of class actions by the public and the impact upon the 
selection and settlement of lawsuits). 
 
30
 See NAGAREDA, supra note 22, at 11–54. 
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attracting more scholarly attention than almost any other,31 disaggregation may 
become even more controversial.32 
Disaggregation has the potential to substantially limit the experiment with 
aggregation that has occurred over the past half century—giving defendants no 
less than the option to avoid class actions altogether. The Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts, in both their procedural33 and substantive34 rulings, have 
already focused on the due process limitations on aggregation, chipping away 
at the potential expanse of aggregation.35 But now, disaggregation gives 
private parties the power to chip away at aggregation from the opposite end of 
the spectrum: Pre-dispute, contracting parties can use arbitration provisions to 
waive aggregation—preventing the pursuit of any future class action.36 Post-
dispute, defendants in contract and tort actions alike can now use 
disaggregative settlements not just to deter the filing of a class action, but to 
prevent a class action altogether.37 
The primary carveout to this newly emerging doctrine exists where the 




 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State 
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 488 (2012) (“Few aspects of contemporary civil litigation have 
attracted as much scholarly attention as the damages class action. Commentators have criticized class actions 
as either too powerful or not powerful enough . . . .”(footnote omitted)); Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 97 (2009) (“Few pretrial motions in our 
civil justice system elicit as much controversy as those for the certification of class actions.”); Sergio J. 
Campos, Class Actions All the Way Down, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 20, 20 (2013), http://www. 
columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/20_Campos.pdf (“[T]he class action [is] arguably the 
most controversial procedure in civil litigation.”). 
 
32
 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern 
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373–79 (2005) (predicting with disappointment the end of the class 
action procedure as a result of “the demise of mass tort class actions and the rise of contractual class action 
waivers”); Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving 
Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 825 (2011) (criticizing one such “defendant-created 
and directed” disaggregative device as “a model essentially unconstrained by law”); Resnik, supra note 16, at 
161–68 (critiquing recent Supreme Court decisions that subsequently imposed greater entry barriers to federal 
courts through disaggregation). 
 
33
 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–22 (1997). 
 
34
 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–63 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
 
35
 See, e.g., Burch, supra note 14, at 667; Resnik supra note 16, at 93. 
 
36
 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–53 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681–89 (2010). 
 
37
 See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1210–15 (10th Cir. 2012); In re 
Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751–53 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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corporation has not offered full compensation in its disaggregative process.38 
Yet, in many cases the same individualized inquiries that interfere with 
damages may also drive variation in liability or manageability questions 
sufficient to preclude class certification.39 Thus, private disaggregative 
mechanisms may have the greatest power in shielding defendants in the cases 
that were the last stand of the class action system. The confluence of this early 
precedent then suggests that, unless we change the direction of our doctrine, if 
the defendant prefers to avoid a class action it can readily use disaggregative 
mechanisms to do so. The practical impact of this innovation is the radical 
notion that we are on the precipice of a world in which many class actions may 
be maintained only with the defendant’s blessing. 
In the shadows of this broader systemic shift lurk concerns with the 
operation of these private mechanisms. In the shadow of aggregation, the 
particular outcomes obtained have the potential to either substantially 
undercompensate or overcompensate claimants.40 These consequences flow in 
part from the bypassing of merits determinations that many disaggregative 
processes formally employ or informally incentivize.41 But these outcomes are 
also the result of a process that is typically defendant driven, with the 
defendant acting as the systems designer, not only crafting the rules of the 
game but also selecting the umpire who will make the calls—giving rise to 
substantial legitimacy questions.42 
The existing literature typically frames this dynamic as a conflict between 




 See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 
295 F.R.D. 112, 161 (E.D. La. 2013) (certifying class and approving class settlement). 
 
39
 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–52, 2557 (2011) (reversing a decision to 
certify a class for a lack of commonality among the 1.5 million members, and finding their claims for backpay 
to have been improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2)). 
 
40
 See infra Part III.A. 
 
41
 For an excellent discussion of the normative consequences of a privately ordered shift toward minimal 
process in the single-plaintiff context, see Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 805 (2011). 
 
42
 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1631–35 (2005).  
 
43
 See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of 
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 922–23 (2010); Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement 
Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5, 13–15), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243155; Deborah E. Greenspan & Matthew A. Neuburger, Settle or 
Sue? The Use and Structure of Alternative Compensation Programs in the Mass Claims Context, 17 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 97, 129–36 (2012); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: 
An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 248 (2000).  
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substantive law, social justice, and the larger public interest on the other.44 Yet 
those seeking to restrict disaggregation have struggled to find a legal basis to 
do so, and, more broadly, to reconcile such a restriction with the default rule 
permitting parties to settle their claims without court approval or 
intervention.45 
This Article reconceptualizes this conflict, arguing that the privatized 
nature of the existing disaggregation system is the source of many of the 
problems identified.46 Thus, while parties elect private disaggregative 
mechanisms because they yield better outcomes than the default litigation 
system, in many disputes a public disaggregative mechanism would offer a 
superior option. Yet no public mechanism exists. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the systemic costs and 
failures of public aggregation mechanisms that gave rise to disaggregation. 
Part II introduces the concept of private disaggregation, and then sets forth a 
typology of existing disaggregative systems. Part III explores the consequences 
of disaggregation for the twin goals of compensation and deterrence, as well as 
the broader public interest in the availability of legitimate and transparent 
processes. In contrast to the existing literature, this Part argues that a web of 
interrelated factors—including the size, similarity, and sophistication of the 
population seeking relief—can create a bias favoring not only defendants but 
also claimants. This analysis suggests that current limits on disaggregation, 
while well intentioned, do not obtain optimal results. Finally, this Article offers 
a few concluding observations on the impact the innovation of private 
disaggregation has upon our ability to rely upon private rights of action as a 




 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-compete 
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379–80, 383 (2006); Mullenix, 
supra note 32, at 825; Resnik, supra note 16, at 161–68; Adriaan Lanni, Note, Protecting Public Rights in 
Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J. 1157, 1161 (1998). 
 
45
 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic 
Legitimacy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE 




 See infra Part III. 
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I. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF DISAGGREGATION AS A HANDMAIDEN 
OF AGGREGATION 
A. The Necessity of Disaggregation in Mass Claims Compensation 
Scholars have long debated the optimal dispute resolution structure for 
processing mass claims. The inherent challenge stems from the realization that 
single-plaintiff litigation results in suboptimal levels of compensation and 
deterrence where wrongs are perpetrated on a large scale.47 The emergence of 
aggregate litigation through Rule 23 was thus largely an attempt to vindicate 
“the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective 
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.”48 Through aggregation, the 
asymmetrical investment incentives that would otherwise exist could be 
corrected, encouraging both parties to make an optimal investment in the 
litigation process.49 Aggregation held the promise of not only improved 
enforcement and deterrence, but also more systematic treatment of wrongs and 
greater consistency across similarly situated victims,50 with more efficiency 
than individualized litigation.51 
Despite its promise, aggregation could only resolve the common questions 
of litigation; it could not determine individual-specific elements of a claim, 
defenses, or damages.52 Thus, disaggregation became a crucial feature of 
aggregation-based mechanisms for dispute resolution.53 The dynamics of class 
actions—and aggregation generally—almost inevitably lead to a high 
probability of settlement prior to trial, given the stakes for both sides in the all-




 See Nagareda, supra note 20, at 751, 754, 770, 821 (“[T]he existence of a credible mass tort class 
settlement removes the possibility of a deterrence gap by virtually eliminating the prospect that too few 
compensation claims will be filed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The nature of these claims can vary 
widely as the problem of vindication is quintessentially one of the ratio of damages to litigation costs, such that 
even high-value claims can fall within this category. See id. at 750. Mass tort claims are an exemplar, as the 
alleged damages may include substantial claims for personal injury or wrongful death, but establishing 
causation may require the costly development of epidemiological evidence, expert testimony, and voluminous 
document review. See id. at 750, 827. 
 
48
 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Kaplan, supra note 2, at 497). 
 
49
 See Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 852. 
 
50
 See Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 308, 382 (1996). 
 
51
 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 135–36 (1995) (describing 
the efficiency benefits of aggregation). 
 
52
 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011) (holding that the defendant has a 
due process right to present individualized defenses in a class action proceeding). 
 
53
 See McGovern, supra note 15, at 1380–81. 
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requires.54 Disaggregation has therefore become the mechanism for 
distributing the proceeds of a settlement to individual class members.55 
Modern class settlements looked to the public law model of disaggregation, 
creating eligibility and compensation frameworks in the settlement agreement 
akin to those embedded in the congressional authorizations of public 
tribunals.56 Claims settlement facilities are then employed to distribute 
individual compensatory awards pursuant to those frameworks.57 Because 
claims facilities have received little scholarly attention, a brief introduction is 
useful in understanding the operation of the existing aggregate system, the 
impetus it creates toward disaggregation, and the ways in which disaggregation 
can enlarge the pool of funds available to the parties—allowing both sides to 
simultaneously receive a superior net outcome as contrasted with 
aggregation.58 
B. The Class Action Settlement Process 
Once the court has approved a class settlement, as required by Rule 23, an 
administrator is typically engaged to provide class notices and manage the 
claims fund. The small cadre of leading settlement administration firms has 
developed best practices for managing the complex operational details that 
frequently emerge during the notice and distribution processes. There are 
generally two roles incorporated within this function: (1) determining whether 
the individual is properly entitled to participation in the settlement, and (2) 




 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (describing 
certification as “forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial” or “to 
settle even if they have no legal liability” out of “fear of the risk of bankruptcy”). But see Stephen B. Burbank 
& Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 59–
61 (2010) (“What is striking . . . is Judge Posner’s lack of attention in the first part of his analysis to the policy 
differences that States might have regarding the ‘mature tort’ problem and the relative merits of decentralized 
adjudication, which offers the benefit of accreted wisdom over time but may produce results that lack 
uniformity and appear arbitrary, versus a high-stakes industry-wide trial, which creates greater risks of 
inaccurate or unreliable results but also provides greater parity and fairness among claimants.”). 
 
55
 See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 507–12 (2011). 
 
56




 See McGovern, supra note 15, at 1365. 
 
58
 See Deborah R. Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2005) (noting that claims resolution facilities have “largely escaped the scrutiny of 
legal scholars”). 
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The predominant form of aggregate settlement provides for an allocation-
only function, in which the claims administrator allocates a defined fund 
among claimants.59 Typical allocation structures include flat rate, in which all 
claimants receive the same relief; flat-rate election, in which all claimants are 
given the choice among a small number of remedies; and formula or grid 
structures, in which certain predefined criteria are used to calculate the 
compensation due.60 While one could envision a system in which the 
administrator is given the discretion to make an individualized determination, 
both parties typically favor providing clear guidance to the administrator. 
Moreover, this clarity is useful in demonstrating to the court that the absent 
class members have enough information about their likely recovery to make 
informed decisions about participation.61 As a result, most settlements adopt a 
clear payout formula. 
1. Barriers to Compensation 
In recent years, claims forms have become a common feature in 
settlements, whether because of difficulties in determining the identity or 
location of class members to send payment or because of potential variations in 
the harm suffered by the class.62 While a class action binds all members of the 
class, only the fraction who submit claims forms receive compensation where 
such a form is required. A recent study by Rust Consulting—one of the 
preeminent settlement administration firms—found that the claims form 
completion rate is approximately 2%–20% in consumer cases, while higher 
rates are obtained in securities cases (20%–35%) and employment cases (20%–
85%).63 As a matter of best practices, there is pressure for courts to ensure that 
claims forms are actually necessary in any particular case—either to identify 




 See Zimmerman, supra note 55, at 511–12. 
 
60
 See Francis E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions—Claims Administration, 35 J. CORP. 
L. 123, 126–33 (2009) (describing various settlement structures as case studies, without creating a typology). 
 
61
 Cf. McGovern, supra note 15, at 1376–77 (recognizing the tensions inherent in requiring opt-out 
before awards are calculated). 
 
62
 See Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide, FED. JUD. 
CTR. 6 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/NotCheck.pdf/$file/NotCheck.pdf (treating claim 
forms as a common practice). 
 
63
 See Tiffany Allen, Anticipating Claims Filing Rates in Class Action Settlements, CLASS ACTION 




 See Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide, supra note 
62, at 6. 
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this leads to the astonishing notion that many class actions are only providing 
compensation to a small fraction of the harmed individuals, while preclusion 
operates to bar the remaining individuals’ claims.65 
Equally notable, the structure of class actions requires that absent class 
members be given the choice not only to file a claim form, but also to opt out 
of the settlement and retain their right to sue individually, or object to the 
settlement altogether.66 While these options promote due process and 
autonomy, the practical result is often confusion among absent class members 
who, confronted with various forms, complete the wrong paperwork—for 
example, opting out of the settlement when they intend to accept payment.67 In 
one notable case, 10,000 claims forms were filed, but 20,000 requests for 
exclusion were filed.68 
2. Fixed-Fund Versus Claims-Made Settlements 
In these structures there remains a question of precisely what compensation 
will be determined to be due, and successfully paid, given the high probability 
of absent class members who fail to file claims forms or even cash checks 
mailed to their last known addresses.69 Therefore, the establishment of a total 
fund in the settlement agreement is common.70 Innovative multitiered payment 




 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (2010) 
(recommending judges limit such payments “to circumstances in which direct distribution to individual class 
members is not economically feasible, or where funds remain after class members are given a full opportunity 
to make a claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
This observation does not account for the practice of settling class claims without even attempting to 
make distribution to the class—a phenomenon that has troubled class action scholars who view the practice as 
an abandonment of one’s duty to the class in favor of a charitable group comprised of individuals who are not 
clients (but are instead, for example, political allies). Yet, lawyers have argued that in small-value cases the 
transaction costs of payment can exceed damages. See Lemos, supra note 31, at 528–29 (describing objections 
to cy pres distributions and documenting examples of politically directed cy pres recoveries). 
 
66
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), (e)(4). 
 
67
 McGovern, supra note 60, at 127. 
 
68
 Id. at 126–27.  
 
69
 Five to twenty-five percent of checks issued in class actions remain uncashed. See Class Notice & 
Settlement Administration: Avoiding the Pitfalls—Part I, CLASS ACTION PERSP. (Rust Consulting, Inc., 




 With improved technology, some funds have been able to make automatic payments to all class 
members. However, these payment structures require substantial information about claimants, which is 
frequently unavailable. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 1167. 
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will ultimately be donated to charity through a cy pres distribution.71 A total 
settlement fund benefits both the defendant and the class counsel. For the 
defendant, this provides certainty to financial markets about the extent of 
liability, a step commonly regarded as advantageous to stock price.72 For the 
class counsel, this provides a ready benchmark by which the court can measure 
the counsel’s success, a key component in the determination of attorneys’ 
fees.73 
Yet notable outliers exist. For example, Congress gave the special master 
administering the September 11th Compensation Fund the ability to determine 
the overall size of the claims fund.74 Similarly, the silicone gel breast implant 
settlement is one of the most prominent examples of a private fund utilizing 
this model, as private defendants typically demand certainty and global peace 
in exchange for their agreement to settle.75 In that case, defendants in an MDL 
proceeding agreed to form a “claims-made” fund, in which those individuals 
submitting claims and meeting the established criteria would receive payments 
according to a defined schedule.76 The unlimited fund feature of these 
programs can be a useful bridge in negotiations, particularly where counsel 
cannot agree upon the likely value and number of claims—and thus cannot 
reach agreement on the derivative total settlement figure.77 
But, arbitraging this asymmetry in expectations does include risk. If the 




 A cy pres distribution occurs when class damages cannot be feasibly distributed or when a balance 
remains; under this system, the funds are to be distributed to the next best compensation use, typically a 
charitable donation. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 23, § 11:20. For an excellent discussion of the cy 
pres system, see William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2159–71 (2004). 
 
72




 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory 
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677–84 
(1986) (describing fee structures and incentives for class counsel).  
 
74
 For varied analysis, see Symposium, After Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the 
Future of Civil Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 205 (2003). 
 
75
 See McGovern, supra note 15, at 1363–64 (discussing the September 11th Compensation Fund and 
silicone gel breast implant settlements as exemplars of funds that do not establish overall fund limits but 
instead “the total amount of damages would be the sum of the subsequently determined individual amounts”). 
 
76
 Settlement Facility and Fund Distribution Agreement Between Dow Corning Corporation and the 
Claimants’ Advisory Committee at 2–3, In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 705 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) 
(No. 95-20512).  
 
77
 See McGovern, supra note 60, at 1389.  
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provided for in any potentially undercapitalized fixed-fund settlement.78 If the 
liability is too great, it may risk bankrupting the involved defendants—as 
occurred in the asbestos and breast implant litigation contexts.79 While 
bankruptcy does not bar recovery, it may require presentment of claims and set 
cutoff dates that are impossible for those with latent claims to meet, resulting 
in diminished or permissive payout structures—the reality faced by many 
breast implant claimants.80 For these reasons, claims-made funds have 
generally been disfavored by counsel to both parties. Claims-made funds thus 
remain a tool most commonly used by public institutions seeking to effectuate 
broader instrumental goals, transcending the immediate resolution of claims. 
3. The Hidden Costs of Fixed Funds 
The prevalence of fixed-fund structures then creates an allocation problem 
in all but the simplest cases. In order to reach agreement upon an aggregate 
total, either the amount of each absent class member’s claim must be 
determined in advance, or the administrator must be given power to ascertain 
these awards. Determining a binding claim value in advance requires counsel 
to ascertain the relevant variables to compensation and reach agreement on the 
details of compensation at a micro level. But, often parties are instead 
incentivized to simply agree to an overall settlement figure first, then later 
reach agreement on how that fund should be allocated. As a result, rather than 
having a bottom-up settlement that reflects the aggregate value of the 
individual claims, the settlement is a top-down settlement in which claimants 
effectively compete for allocation of a fixed-fund. Moreover, in high-profile 
settlements in which objections are anticipated from outside plaintiffs’ firms, 
errors or omissions in defining these variables may lead to denial of the motion 




 For an excellent discussion of undercapitalization and the resulting need for a second opt-out 
opportunity, see Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and 
Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801, 803–07 (2000). 
 
79
 Anthony J. Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Mass Torts?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1213, 1213 (2008) (reviewing NAGAREDA, supra note 22). 
 
80
 See Agreed Order Allowing Certain Late Claimants Limited Rights to Participate in the Plan’s 




 See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1459 (2006) (concluding that “the track record of professional objectors to date . . . has 
been less than stellar”). 
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In contrast, if the parties seek to reach agreement on an overall figure 
without providing a specific formula for allocation of compensation using 
already-known variables, undercapitalization is possible. Indeed, the initial 
silicone gel breast implant settlement suffered from precisely this defect, 
resulting in a cramdown, or ratcheting, of the absent class members’ awards 
and triggering a second opt-out opportunity for the class members.82 Because 
of the potential for undercapitalization, it is at times a “best practice” to 
withhold payment of class members’ claims until all payments have been 
calculated in order to ensure that sufficient monies exist to satisfy all awards at 
the same pro rata payout percentage. 
Withholding in turn creates another set of tradeoffs: delaying payments in 
full requires claimants to wait until the conclusion of the proceedings to 
receive monies that may be needed immediately for resulting medical 
treatment and other expenses. However, creating a multi-tranche payout 
scheme increases administrative costs, limiting the pool of resources available 
for the settlement. These dynamics make clear that in fixed-fund cases, there 
may be real conflict among class members who are, de facto, competing for a 
share of the fund. 
4. Settlement Motivations and Agency Costs 
Given this complexity, why is it that disaggregation has been viewed as a 
mere ministerial detail?83 For defendants, as deterrence theory suggests, the 
dominant consideration in settlements is the total payout and the degree of 
closure they will receive in exchange for that payment.84 For class counsel, 
fees are calculated based upon the overall aggregate recovery.85 Thus, for both 
sets of counsel, so long as the allocation is not so unfair as to prompt a high 
opt-out rate or later collateral attack, there is no structural incentive to invest 




 Walker & Monahan, supra note 78, at 803–07. 
 
83
 See Hensler, supra note 58, at 1429, 1439 (lamenting the lack of scholarship on claims administration).  
 
84
 See Nagareda, supra note 56, at 914 (“From the defendants’ standpoint . . . settlement is attractive only 
to the extent that it does not merely resolve pending cases but, in addition, provides assurance that such action 
will not result in a deluge of marginal cases.”).  
 
85
 See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating 
Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1527 (1998).  
 
86
 For a discussion of the agency dynamics that drive class settlement allocations between class 
members, see generally Samuel Issacharoff et al., Bargaining Impediments and Settlement Behavior, in 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP (David A. Anderson ed., 1996); Marcel Kahan & 
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, 
Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998); Silver & Baker, supra note 85.  
DODGE GALLEYSPROOFS 6/30/2014 1:55 PM 
1270 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1253 
The incentive is therefore toward creating the broadest possible class in 
settlement, which provides greater closure to the defendant and enhances the 
attorneys’ fees award to class counsel—a structural incentive checked only by 
increasingly stringent court review. However, the structure of settlement 
approval hearings necessarily operates so that counsel for both sides are 
unified in their desire to obtain approval, thus minimizing any issues appearing 
before the court.87 
Moreover, absent class members often lack not only the incentive, but also 
the discovery necessary to uncover these differences, given the negative-value 
considerations that prompted the initial creation of aggregation. Thus, unless a 
competing plaintiffs’ firm seeks to appear as counsel for an objecting party as a 
means of preventing settlement or gaining a seat at the negotiating table—a 
dynamic that typically occurs in only the largest settlements, but is unlikely in 
most class actions—the Rule 23 structure does not result in any actor with both 
the incentive and ability to raise these conflicts to the court.88 
C. The Impetus for Privatization 
In the existing public litigation system, disaggregation is simply a 
mechanism for implementing an aggregate settlement. While the aggregate 
settlement figure may reflect a proper deterrent value, the individual 
settlements that result in its shadow may fail to provide an accurate level of 
compensation because of the emphasis on collective treatment and 
minimization of administrative costs. Yet, for an absent class member, opting 
out of the settlement will mean litigating the claim individually or with the 
handful of other opt-outs—frequently a negative-value proposition.89 The 
rational choice for an absent class member is then to remain in the aggregate 
settlement, even if it is substantially undercompensating his or her losses. Yet 
this dynamic suggests the possibility from the claimant’s perspective of a more 
optimal compensation system focused upon disaggregated compensation, 




 See Rubenstein, supra note 81, at 1445. 
 
88
 See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 




 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
288, 304–05 (2010). 
 
90
 See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class 
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871–79 (2002). 
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II. THE NEW GENERATION OF DISAGGREGATIVE STRUCTURES 
Aggregation promised to ameliorate the irremediability of certain types of 
harms, to create improved deterrence for widespread but negative-value 
wrongs, and to correct the asymmetries inherent to the single-plaintiff litigation 
system that emerged in the context of mass claims. Yet the solution of 
aggregation created its own well-documented costs resulting from the 
additional procedural protections aggregation entailed, a new set of 
dislocations91 in settlement values, and ultimately dysfunction harmful to 
plaintiffs and defendants alike. In the intervening decades, scholars and 
lawmakers have proposed countless modifications, expansions, and alterations 
to the aggregate litigation system designed to ameliorate these dislocations, but 
the underlying dysfunction remains. 
In this Part, I argue that disaggregation is emerging as a new approach to 
mass claims resolution, creating a new set of dispute resolution mechanisms 
distinct from those of aggregation. This Part outlines the sources of parties’ 
dissatisfaction with the traditional aggregative process, which created the 
conditions that fostered the birth of these new private mechanisms. The 
analysis then turns to the ways in which procedural and substantive 
streamlining operate, identifying the situations in which parties should elect 
these mechanisms as superior to the public litigation and aggregation systems. 
Disaggregation is already the mechanism by which every award of 
compensation to a mass claims victim is made. Disaggregation is essential 
even in aggregative proceedings because an individual’s status as a victim 
eligible for compensation must, by definition, be determined on an individual 




 For every claim, there is an optimal point of both compensation and deterrence associated with the 
value of the claim. Determining this optimal point within the law is, in the first instance, a matter for the 
legislature in crafting the available remedies, but then requires substantial individualized discovery and 
assessment to determine the precise value of any particular legal right in a particular case. In addition, scholars 
will often argue that particular legal frameworks are not obtaining the optimal levels of compensation or 
deterrence given particular normative goals. 
This Article argues that there are a number of factors that can shift settlement values from these 
optimal points, wherever set. The term “dislocation” is used throughout my analysis to show that these shifts 
are bilateral, in contrast with the traditional terminology that often suggests a merely one-directional shift from 
this optimal value point. 
 
92
 The use of disaggregation, even in this traditional setting, has “largely escaped the scrutiny of legal 
scholars.” Hensler, supra note 58, at 1429, 1439 (“It is time to get serious about understanding the role claims 
resolution facilities are playing in the delivery of civil justice in the United States.”). But see Georgene Vairo, 
Why Me? The Role of Private Trustees in Complex Claims Resolution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1391, 1392–93 (2005) 
(advocating for the use of administrative trusts run by private persons). 
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handmaiden of aggregation. But I argue that today parties are engaging in a 
trend of “responsive opt-out,” in which they contractually bypass aggregation 
altogether, employing disaggregation not as a mere handmaiden but as the 
mechanism for reaching settlement. 
In recent years, controversy has swirled around predispute arbitration 
agreements and postdispute settlement offers made by defendants to undermine 
class actions, as exemplified most prominently by the BP Gulf Coast Claims 
Fund.93 I argue that these mechanisms are each instantiations of a new trend 
toward disaggregative systems design, as defendants have increasingly realized 
that reliance upon disaggregation as a substitute for aggregative mechanisms 
can yield vastly superior outcomes in contrast with the default public litigation 
system. This reconceptualization reveals that disaggregation is not limited to 
its traditional role as a handmaiden to aggregation, but is instead a new, 
second, and co-equal, but heretofore unexplored, branch of mass claims 
systems design—rivaling the field of aggregation. 
In this new world, parties are no longer merely selecting among the 
available mechanisms for aggregation within our public litigation system. This 
emerging innovation in the pre- and postdispute use of disaggregation reflects 
a grassroots realization that in certain cases the costs of aggregation to the 
parties, in both outlays to third parties and the costs derivative of uncertainty 
and a delay in settlement, will at times be greater than the initial difference in 
claims valuation between the parties. The result is such that seriatim, 
individual settlement is superior to undertaking the costs of aggregation, 
particularly given that disaggregation remains the endgame of aggregate 
settlements. 
These new disaggregative mechanisms are thus able to remove not only the 
high procedural costs that aggregation entails for the protection of both absent 
class members and defendants, but also to unwind the transformation of the 
bargaining process that aggregation yields. Moreover, for defendants, 
postdispute disaggregative settlements may offer substantial public relations 
benefits as they attempt to “make right” a wrong, while simultaneously 
reassuring shareholders about the company’s ability to quickly resolve the 
pending liability. These second-generation opt-out structures have generated 
substantial controversy, framed alternatively as incredibly innovative and 




 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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unconscionable procedural mechanisms created by corporations to exploit 
victims and externalize the costs of their tortious or otherwise illegal behavior. 
To be clear, my claim is not that aggregation has no value. Rather, that 
from a systems design perspective, it yields suboptimal outcomes for the 
parties with respect to particular types of claims. For this reason, I argue, we 
see a trend toward disaggregation not only in private party disputes but also in 
public mass claims tribunals. While the motivations of the parties and, in turn, 
the necessity of external limitations are inherently very different in the public 
and private contexts, I reserve this issue for the later Parts of this Article. In 
this Part, I only seek to establish the existence of this branch of disaggregative 
mass claims resolution mechanisms and begin to identify the situations in 
which parties may turn to disaggregative tribunals. 
The consequences of this investigation are significant. This transition 
toward private ordering creates a new, second branch of dispute resolution 
mechanisms and scholarship. But, it also has substantial implications for our 
aggregate litigation scholarship. In the design of public aggregate litigation 
mechanisms we must no longer focus exclusively upon the ability of the rules 
to create optimal outcomes in the trial, or settlement, of mass claims. Rather, 
parties are increasingly treating these mechanisms as mere default rules—as a 
starting point in negotiation for a disaggregative process. Yet the question of 
whether aggregation rules are optimal, not as mandatory rules but instead as 
default rules, has been largely overlooked in the literature. 
A. Basic Typology 
As the preceding discussion suggests, despite aggregate litigation’s promise 
of correcting asymmetries and promoting efficiency, the reality was far 
different. Aggregation surely provided a benefit and helpful innovation over 
the single-plaintiff and joinder systems that preceded it. Yet, these first-
generation mass claims aggregation mechanisms entailed substantial costs,94 
which could easily swamp even high-value litigation recoveries.95 At the same 
time, limitations on the benefits of aggregation became apparent, as protecting 




 For an excellent discussion of agency in Rule 23 classes and MDL, see Macey & Miller, supra note 
24, at 7–8. 
 
95
 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). 
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settlements—and in turn the degree of closure provided to defendants.96 In 
imposing these restrictions, the Supreme Court recognized the intractable 
problems this presented in mass claims resolution: In certain types of cases, 
global aggregate settlements could not be approved consistent with due 
process, while continued litigation was not only value destructive, but would 
create a new set of dislocations as claimants were forced to rush to the 
courthouse before the remaining funds were dissipated.97 
As sophistication with the tools of aggregation increased, sources of 
structural dysfunction became apparent at all phases of the claims maturation 
process. Settlements drifted away from their optimal value—a trend 
exemplified by the nuisance litigation,98 blackmail settlements,99 and 
sweetheart deals100 that evolved in the shadow of aggregation.101 The 
settlements occurring in the shadow of aggregate litigation predictably were 
contaminated by this dysfunction, triggering a widespread critique of 
aggregation as providing suboptimal levels of both compensation and 
deterrence.102 Sadly, little has changed in the nearly two decades since John 
Coffee offered his summary of class litigation: “All that is certain about mass 
tort litigation is that it places a heavy burden on the federal courts, while 
producing often modest and delayed benefits to plaintiffs.”103 
Private disaggregative mass claims resolution mechanisms are substantially 








 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598. The Court expressly invited congressional intervention, recognizing the 
inability of aggregation mechanisms to solve the problem posed by the massive liability created by asbestos 
use. Id. at 598–99; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 865 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Yet, in 
practice, this solution too has proven untenable. Georgene Vairo, Mass Tort Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why 
and The How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 95 (2004) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem and its later 
decision in Ortiz have made it more difficult for companies seeking global peace in resolving a mass tort to use 
Rule 23 settlement classes. Moreover, Congress appears to have failed in its attempt to resolve legislatively the 
protracted asbestos litigation.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 161 (2012) (discussing the incentive of 
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101
 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 65 (2010). 
 
102
 See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 22, at 11–54. 
 
103
 Coffee, supra note 1, at 1346. 
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responded to the failures of single-plaintiff and joinder models of litigation. 
These emerging second-generation mass claims structures focus upon 
addressing the underlying failures of the single-plaintiff model through 
mechanisms other than aggregation, in an effort to avoid the dysfunction 
aggregation is perceived to entail. Broadly characterized, one set of 
mechanisms bars aggregation in favor of individualized hearings, but typically 
substitutes streamlined procedures aimed at reducing or shifting the litigation 
costs that necessitated aggregation.104 A second set of mechanisms removes the 
common questions prerequisite to aggregation, allowing victims to receive 
compensation based upon simply satisfying the individualized proof 
requirements set forth.105 Typically, the first set of mechanisms has been 
utilized pre-dispute, while the second set is more common post-dispute—but 
this results from pragmatic factors, which are discussed in this Part, rather than 
from any absolute requirement. Indeed, many structures combine a certain 
degree of both of these features, creating a broad array of potential systems 
designs. 
At a deeper level, both mechanisms for responsive opt-out can be 
reconceptualized as insights about the limits of the default rules of aggregation. 
By identifying these false assumptions, corporations can craft mechanisms that 
manipulate these features of the system, creating alternatives that are superior 
for both participants. This Part turns to providing a basic typology of these two 
methods, with a particular focus on the systems design choices inherent to both 
structures, highlighting the similarities and contrasts between existing public 
and private disaggregative systems as they operate pre- and post-dispute. 
B. Postdispute Disaggregative Mechanisms 
The proliferation of early individualized settlement offers contravenes the 
established wisdom that defendants will assert classwide defenses and insist 
upon individualized proof as a means of threatening to increase the cost of 
litigation and thus decrease settlement values.106 At the outset, then, one must 
wonder why defendants would create disaggregative structures, surrendering 
the bargaining power derived from delay.107 The impetus for the these funds 




 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 
105
 See infra Part II.A.1. 
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general liability, the costs of aggregation may overwhelm the benefits to the 
parties—making opt-out a mutually value-enhancing option. 
In the wake of the GCCF, a variety of defendants have followed the same 
model, offering various forms of immediate, prelitigation settlement that 
require participants to forgo the possibility of aggregate litigation.108 While 
BP’s GCCF was formed months after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the 
delay in formation is quickly shortening: the Costa Concordia settlement grid 
was negotiated within weeks, while the Chevron refinery explosion fund was 
created in only days.109 Just as defendants are becoming more comfortable 
with quickly instituting these funds, a shortened delay in victim acceptance of 
these funds also seems to be occurring—the Chevron explosion injured 
upwards of 4,000 people, of whom 3,800 sought settlement offers through its 
disaggregated claims procedure by the end of the very week the explosion 
occurred.110 
Skeptics have suggested that these tribunals are simply mechanisms for 
exploiting victims, using legal sleight of hand to offer less compensation than 
available by law and to avoid transparency.111 There are certainly risks and 
disadvantages associated with these structures, which are detailed in the next 
Part. But the commonality between public and private opt-out systems suggests 
that there are legitimate structural motivations for these innovations.112 
The trend toward private disaggregative mechanisms represents a return to 
first principles and creates a degree of unity between public and private 
approaches to mass claims resolution. From nuclear weapons testing to war 
crimes, the government has often been placed in a situation analogous to that 




 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict 
Litigation Judges, 30 MISS C. L. REV. 237, 243 (2011). 
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 See id. Chevron’s fund ultimately ballooned to 23,900 claims filed after 15,000 people sought medical 
treatment, yielding a total payout of approximately $10 million through its claims settlement fund. See 




 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 32, at 825 (reviewing challenges to the legitimacy of the September 
11th Fund and arguing that “[f]or those concerned with the rule of law, equity, and fundamental fairness, the 
GCCF [created by BP] ought to be a cause for concern”). 
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LEGAL STUD. 503, 504–09, 523–25 (2008) (characterizing contractual predispute substantive provisions as 
value-adding and clarifying underlying obligations). 
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individuals seeking compensation for wrongs or harms.113 Surely, sovereign 
immunity accords Congress greater latitude than private defendants possess in 
deciding how to respond to these claims in the first instance.114 Yet despite 
Congress’s constitutional role in creating Article III courts, it has often looked 
not to Article III courts or their aggregation mechanisms, but instead has 
preferred non–Article III tribunals vested with the authority to award 
compensation pursuant to a defined statutory scheme.115 
Rather than simply waiving sovereign immunity and permitting 
adjudication of general liability and damages as defined by background law, 
Congress typically substitutes an eligibility and compensation structure. The 
same waiver of questions of general liability—in favor of a pure focus upon 
the determination of individualized issues of eligibility and compensation—
typifies emerging early settlement offers and funds by private defendants. 
For both public and private funds, the structure of payments is a complex 
decision, embedded with substantial symbolic value. In a purely retrospective 
system, the key stakeholders will typically have a sense of their rights in the 
default system and any asymmetries between their individualized situation and 
the typical harms of others within the system. The result is that as design 
decisions are formulated and established, the stakeholders will frequently be 
aware of the impact it will have upon their particular recovery. In both public 
and private disaggregation, three general compensation structures predominate: 
flat-rate offers, grid/formula structures, and ad hoc determinations by the 
tribunal.116 Both flat-rate offers and grid/formula structures can be categorized 
as “substantive offers,” while ad hoc determinations are more aptly 




 This preference dates from the earliest days of our nation. See Michele L. Landis, “Let Me Next Time 
Be ‘Tried By Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789–1874, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 967, 983 (1998) (describing the transition from “individual to group eligibility criteria in relief 
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1. Substantive Offers: Flat-Rate Offers, Grids, and Formulas 
Flat-rate payouts, as with the reparations made to Japanese-Americans 
interned during World War II,117 are the most streamlined payment structure—
the administrator need only determine that the claimant suffered the identified 
harm, without making any determination of particularized damages. Such a 
payout system can have an important symbolic effect in valuing each life lost 
or harm suffered as equal in value—a critique special master Ken Feinberg 
offered in reflecting on his design of the September 11th Fund, which provided 
differential payouts based upon a formulaic calculation with some discretion 
for modification in exceptional circumstances.118 
But flat-rate payment structures inherently fail to distinguish among levels 
of harm. For example, the Japanese-American citizen who was interned, and 
the citizen whose internment resulted in the additional loss of his home and 
business, would receive identical compensation payments despite clear 
differences in their actual harms. Moreover, although these compensation 
systems are by definition extrinsic to the baseline tort system, participants’ 
conceptions of fairness are often shaped by a tort-law conception of 
damages—an expectation exemplified by September 11th widows dissatisfied 
with the earnings caps imposed by the Fund upon high-income earners killed 
in the tragedy.119 
Private tribunals traditionally operate as litigation substitutes, so the 
efficiency and viability of flat-rate offers are typically correlated with 
commonality in harm suffered. While this type of commonality can exist in 
contractual claims, many regimes need to incorporate either a grid or formula 
component in order to distinguish among levels of harm and thus better 
approximate the legal value of the claim. For example, after the Costa 
Concordia cruise ship ran aground, the cruise line offered all passengers who 
had not suffered substantial physical injuries or death a flat-rate payment of 
around $14,500, in addition to reimbursement of their tickets, costs of flights 
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Substantive offers may not only incorporate separate payment tiers to 
account for the objective differences among plaintiffs, but also incorporate an 
election of remedies, allowing plaintiffs to select among objectively similar 
options based upon individual, subjective preferences. The NFL’s settlement 
offer resulting from its shuffling of a number of ticketholders into less 
desirable seats or standing room only areas in the Dallas Cowboys’ stadium 
during Super Bowl XLV exemplifies this opportunity to create added value.121 
The NFL offered a tiered compensation structure, which each ticketholder 
could choose to accept in lieu of litigation.122 The 2,800 ticketholders who 
were delayed or relocated could choose (a) the face value of their ticket or (b) a 
ticket to a future Super Bowl.123 The 475 ticketholders who did not receive any 
seat were given three options to select among: (a) $2,400 plus a ticket to the 
2012 Super Bowl, which they could use or sell in the secondary market, (b) a 
ticket to a future Super Bowl, including airfare and a four-night hotel stay, or 
(c) a payout of $5,000 or a check for more than $5,000 with documentation 
supporting their expenditures on the actual ticket price paid, travel, lodging, 
and meal expenses.124 
Although the attorney who had filed a class action suit on behalf of the 
ticketholders urged them not to take the settlement, third-party pundits advised 
the putative class through the media that the deal provided a greater recovery 
than parties would receive in court—particularly after one considered the risk 
of loss given that the case for general liability “seems very hard to make.”125 
Moreover, while the court would be limited to the contractual damages 
available, the offer of tickets to a future Super Bowl of the ticketholder’s 
choosing created an offer objectively superior to anything potentially available 
in court.126 Not only did the NFL offer a subjective value for plaintiffs given 
the difficulty in obtaining tickets for a particular Super Bowl, but it also 
offered an enhanced objective value given the secondary market premium on 
tickets.127 
The NFL example highlights the benefits of disaggregation relative to 
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structure operated on an opt-in rather than opt-out basis. Those who failed to 
act would retain their right to sue, in contrast to a class action that would likely 
fail to provide relief to an absent class member who failed to file a claim form 
while simultaneously precluding future suit. Those who chose to settle were 
given greater compensation than available in the courts, without the reduction 
in net compensation for attorneys’ fees and costs. And, this relief was available 
immediately, avoiding the years of delay common to class action litigation. 
Thus, for the ticketholders, the offer was objectively superior to the best 
possible outcome in litigation. 
The NFL was likewise able to decrease its net payout relative to litigation. 
While it paid supercompensation, it saved a substantial sum in attorneys’ fees 
and costs and was able to spread the payout over many years rather than 
making an immediate lump sum payout, to the extent that ticketholders chose 
tickets to future Super Bowls. In addition to these direct monetary benefits, the 
NFL also obtained the public relations benefit of appearing to “do the right 
thing” in taking responsibility for the mistake and compensating the victims 
quickly and fully. Given that the defendant decreased its net payments while 
each claimant received more than he would in litigation, without the delay of 
aggregation, one might posit that the only losing party in the arrangement was 
the putative class counsel. 
It thus appears that the emerging popularity of disaggregation results 
precisely from its potential for mutually superior outcomes for both parties—as 
juxtaposed with the dysfunction and delay inherent to aggregate litigation. 
2. Process Offers: Ad Hoc Determinations 
While substantive offers are efficient in reducing administrative cost, they 
typically eliminate both the need for a hearing—at which the victim can speak 
about the loss suffered—and the resulting benefits of closure and a sense of 
fairness that may accompany such an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, they 
necessitate the creation of an objective mechanism for payment and 
compensation, which may entail substantial costs if, despite the similarity in 
cause, the particular harms suffered are highly variable. For this reason, 
Congress has granted some public tribunals the ability to make individualized 
damages determinations. For example, the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims 
Tribunal could make reparations without particular direction or guidelines on 
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how to allocate the allotted funds,128 and the special master in the September 
11th Fund was empowered to create the compensation structure for victims.129 
From a systems design standpoint, this allows for greater accuracy in the 
determination of compensation where the cause of the injury may be common 
but the harms are highly individualized. These systems are typically more 
efficient, as questions and variations in harm need not be anticipated in 
advance, but can be addressed on an as-raised basis—mirroring our system of 
common law precedent. Over time, these systems typically develop their own 
interpretations of legal questions common to the relief, taking on a higher 
degree of standardization akin to substantive offers and enhancing the 
legitimacy of the tribunal’s determination.130 
Consider the Gulf Coast Compensation Fund created by BP in the wake of 
the Deepwater Horizon explosion.131 BP framed the GCCF as a full 
compensation fund: it would pay out at a 100% rate for all damages recognized 
by the Fund’s administrators.132 Full-payout settlements are relatively 
uncommon in aggregate and single-plaintiff litigation, as defendants 
commonly negotiate for a risk discount for their surrender of remaining 
defenses, a reduction to net present-value prices, and even a reduction in 
litigation costs.133 But disaggregation does not allow for these negotiations 
with an agent—in contrast to the discounts negotiated with class counsel in 
aggregate settlements. 
Instead, BP needed to entice each claimant to affirmatively opt into its 
fund. Its selection of a full-payout rate provided a preliminary assurance to 
potential claimants that, so long as the administrator properly determines the 
claims payable, they should receive the greatest possible compensation for 
their losses—free of the allocational error, diminution for attorneys’ fees and 
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of full compensation combined with the procedural structure and selection of 
Ken Feinberg—the September 11th Fund administrator—enhanced the 
legitimacy and perception of fairness for some claimants.135 
Although the GCCF was formally structured as a fixed fund, its structure 
created very different incentives and efficiencies than Rule 23 fixed funds. 
With some exceptions, parties in class settlements typically first negotiate the 
size of the fund, only secondarily turning to questions of allocation.136 This 
negotiating structure flows naturally from the defendant’s concern with 
limiting its total expenditure on the one hand, and the class counsel’s concern 
with payment structure, which is keyed to the aggregate amount recovered, on 
the other hand. But it is equally a result of the tradeoffs that can be made in the 
negotiation process—for example, expanding or contracting the class 
definition or scope of claims covered by the settlement to obtain a balance 
between the scope of peace granted to the defendant and the price paid. 
Although technology has improved the distribution process and costs to 
decrease the residual,137 there inevitably remains a balance in the settlement 
fund. Courts expect as a matter of course that the residual will be donated 
through a cy pres charitable distribution. The return of the residual balance to 
the defendant is not permitted—as courts expect that the settlement value 
reflected the proper level of damages—and parties, having reached the end of 
the settlement process, are reluctant to risk rejection of the settlement over the 
allocation of the cy pres. The traditional class settlement thus requires 
extensive discovery with respect to the likely scope and magnitude of damages 
prerequisite to settlement. 
In contrast, the GCCF’s structure did not require this investment of 
resources prior to settlement. The Fund was given substantial resources that 
currently appear to far exceed the actual damages it is meant to secure, and, 
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themselves of the default litigation system.138 This largesse was possible 
because the residual of the Fund reverts to BP, and because the payments to the 
Fund are structured longitudinally, allowing BP to fund the GCCF with future 
revenues.
139
 This allowed the Fund to be created while the oil spill was still 
ongoing—a result that would be highly improbable under the traditional fixed-
fund class settlement, given the fiduciary obligations of class counsel. Thus, 
although disapproved under the traditional Rule 23 structure, an opt-in early 
settlement fund can utilize a BP-style fund structure to deliver compensation 
much more quickly than traditional settlement funds.140 
From this perspective, the waiver of substantive liability questions can 
generate a substantial joint benefit sufficient to create a zone of agreement 
without litigation or discovery, given that aggregation costs can equal—and in 
some cases even exceed—the alleged liability. 
C. Predispute Creation of Disaggregative Mechanisms 
Prospective waivers of aggregation are premised upon a simple insight: The 
aggregate litigation system results in high costs, diminishing net value to both 
parties. Eliminating these costs—both the procedural checks aggregation 
entails to ensure due process and the free-riding by passive absent class 
members—can create joint gains. 
Publicly created prospective tribunals present a somewhat different design 
challenge than purely retrospective tribunals, because they are intended to 
create a streamlined framework for continuing or future harms. Typically, 
these systems are designed to promote the efficient resolution of claims against 
the government as an employer, as with the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits 
Program, Radiation Exposure Compensation Program, Countermeasures Injury 
Compensation Program, and Smallpox Compensation Program, which operate 
as specialized, public workers’ compensation systems.141 Thus, these systems 
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claimants is reduced and compensation is awarded based upon a grid—one that 
often awards less compensation than the tort system would for the same harm. 
Prospective agreements between private parties have likewise modified the 
compensation framework, but they have taken a very different form. Private 
defendants have typically offered supercompensation in excess of that 
available in the default legal system—in contrast to the decrease in 
compensation common in the public model. Both models provide for 
procedural streamlining, reducing the litigation costs to the would-be 
defendant and, typically, providing greater compensation to claimants. Viewed 
from the perspective of any claimant, the offers of private defendants are 
actually superior to not only the default litigation system, but even the 
prospective systems created by the government as a defendant. 
Why then have these private aggregation waivers engendered so much 
opposition?142 The simple answer is that, in contrast to the high-value claims 
common to the public system, these corporate provisions have the greatest 
value where the expected claims rate will be particularly low. This observation 
implicates difficult questions about optimal deterrence and the role of class 
action litigation. 
One of the predominant uses of class action litigation in recent decades has 
been the pursuit of small-value wrongs against large groups, correcting the 
underenforcement of claims; consumer claims provide a familiar example. But 
the high costs of litigating pressure even defendants that expect to prevail on 
the merits to consent to an early, nuisance settlement of a claim. This decision 
to settle will occur even in cases the defendant believes are so frivolous that 
few if any plaintiffs would have pursued it in single-plaintiff litigation—not 
because of the costs, but because of the weak merits of the case. In recent 
years, with the increasing expanse of hold orders in the new era of e-discovery, 
the costs of avoiding claims of spoliation have only increased this pressure. For 
defendants, aggregation imposes substantial costs—whether correctly imposed 
for small-value wrongs, or inefficiently imposed through nuisance litigation—
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Streamlined procedural provisions are thus commonly used where a 
defendant anticipates claims that few absent class members are likely to bring 
individually. Most often, these explicit or implicit aggregation waivers are 
embedded in a dispute resolution provision providing for streamlined 
individual hearings or arbitration. However, the same result may be 
substantially achieved by contracting for forums that fracture the would-be 
class. 
To better frame our discussion, consider the provision at issue in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.143 The plaintiffs sued alleging that when AT&T 
offered new subscribers a free cell phone, it should not only have provided the 
cell phone free of charge but also paid the state sales tax on the phone.144 
AT&T’s form contract provided that the parties agree to resolve disputes 
valued at under $10,000, at the customer’s option, through arbitration or small-
claims court, with AT&T waiving its rights to attorneys’ fees, agreeing to pay 
double plaintiff’s attorneys fees, and finally agreeing to pay a minimum of 
$7,500 to the claimant if the amount awarded to the customer in arbitration 
exceeds the last written settlement offer of AT&T.145 The company sought to 
provide more efficient and cost-effective remedies for consumers than the 
default system—in exchange for a waiver of the consumer’s ability to bring 
claims on behalf of third-party consumers.146 The Supreme Court upheld 
AT&T’s provision.147 
In its opinion, the Court noted that AT&T’s system permitted the effective 
vindication of consumers’ rights in ways that many consumers would 
reasonably view as superior to the default system.148 By limiting the scope of 
the claim to those who choose to vindicate their claims, the risk of loss for the 
corporation is decreased, allowing it to not only streamline procedure and offer 
supercompensation, but also make quick settlement offers.149 
Contextualizing these provisions within the spectrum of disaggregative 
mechanisms, procedural streamlining offers plaintiffs a weaker benefit relative 
to other responsive opt-out mechanisms. Pure streamlining provisions reduce 
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default rules governing single-plaintiff litigation into viable claims.150 
However, no provision is made for either waiving common questions or 
aggregating the costs entailed in their proof. The consequence is to return these 
contracting parties to the redundancies and investment asymmetries that 
existed prior to Rule 23’s enactment. 
However, in these mechanisms, publicly available aggregation mechanisms 
function as a default rule, against which the company bargains for waiver. The 
result is typically an upward adjustment of compensation and streamlined 
procedure for the handful of claimants who seek to enforce their rights on an 
individual basis—creating a subsidy by the defendant of the costs entailed in 
individual, rather than aggregated, claims resolution.151 In this paradigm, 
defendants contract to offer supercompensation to the handful of claimants 
who choose to bring claims in a disaggregative system, while still reducing 
overall costs to the corporation. As the Supreme Court noted in Concepcion, 
these provisions are thus superior for those claimants who choose to pursue 
relief—providing a larger recovery far sooner than aggregation would likely 
yield.152 Removing both the costs of aggregation and its de facto mandatory 
class generates this zone of shared gain. 
D. Common Features Across Structures 
This Part has posited that the array of unilateral settlement offers and 
private claims funds are not isolated one-offs, but instead are part of a far 
broader phenomenon. Across the spectrum of claims types, from small-value 
claims for defective children’s toys to high-value claims for mass torts, 
defendants are increasingly making unilateral settlement offers.153 While 
prominent scholars like Samuel Issacharoff have noted that the lack of closure 
will substantially limit these funds, this Article posits a far more complex and 
nuanced picture.154 
Understanding when a defendant will choose to propose a disaggregative 




 See id. at 1749. 
 
151
 Common provisions include corporate agreements to pay the costs of arbitration, reasonable attorneys’ 
fees, or an incentive payment substantially in excess of the alleged damages. See id. at 1744. 
 
152
 See id. at 1752–53.  
 
153
 See Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1177, 1182–83 (2009) (providing examples of recent settlements).  
 
154
 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of 
Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014).  
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settlement offers, but also the broader family of disaggregation. By 
recognizing that these forms of disaggregation share certain common 
motivations and purposes, we can, for the first time, begin to develop a more 
nuanced analysis and typology of these structures. In turn, this allows for a 
more careful consideration of the benefits and potential risks of these 
structures. 
As the defendant typically proposes disaggregation, we should expect to 
see these proposals made with higher frequency where one of three conditions 
exists. First, where the defendant expects it can obtain a high participation rate, 
substantially achieving closure through its ex post creation of a tribunal. 
Second, where the defendant expects that its settlement offer will prevent the 
successful certification of a class—whether by dissuading the filing of a class 
action or by preventing certification under Rule 23. And third, the defendant 
may propose a predispute aggregation waiver where it expects that its largest 
costs will come from either small-value or nuisance suits, premised on alleged 
violations that few of those with whom it contracts would pursue. 
The potential combination of features and structural configurations of 
disaggregative tribunals creates an almost limitless set of design possibilities 
and structures.155 Yet, while disaggregative systems have been widely utilized 
by Congress, given their superiority in efficiently administering compensation, 
congressional structures are inherently public in their creation and operation, 
subject to the indirect checks of democracy. In contrast, the nature of 
privatized disaggregation raises questions about both the existence of 
dysfunction in the disaggregative process and the extent to which these 
mechanisms further or undermine the obtainment of the public purposes of the 
litigation system. It is to those questions that the next Parts turn. 
III. THE SPECTER OF DYSFUNCTION IN DISAGGREGATION 
Disaggregation stands as a new dispute systems design framework, a next-
generation system built upon the foundations and dysfunctions of the aggregate 
and single-plaintiff litigation systems that preceded it. Inevitably—and indeed, 
intentionally—this new privatized system substantially alters the nature of both 
compensation and deterrence, rendering our existing analyses in the single-




 See Hensler, supra note 58, at 1443 (referring to these as “a dizzying array of potential claims 
resolution facility designs”). 
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disaggregation thus prompts us to embark upon the creation of a new branch of 
scholarship focused upon the assessment of these distinctly unique strategic 
behaviors and their fit with our normative goals. 
It is already foreseeable that disaggregation will generate a new set of 
dislocations and dysfunctions, like the aggregate and single-plaintiff litigation 
structures that preceded it. Just as aggregate litigation could not be fully 
explicated in a single article—but instead has led to tens of thousands of 
scholarly articles and books156—so too the questions posed by disaggregation 
are far too broad and complex for any single article to address 
comprehensively. This Part therefore seeks only to commence the dialogue 
about the instrumental consequences of this new generation of private, 
disaggregative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Implicit within this discussion is a recognition of the potential for the rise 
of disaggregative mechanisms to radically reshape the role of aggregation 
mechanisms in two key ways. First, it reshapes the central inquiry of our study 
of aggregation. Complex litigation scholarship has long focused upon 
developing a set of mechanisms for aggregate litigation that provides an 
optimal balance of autonomy and collective interest in the context of mass 
claims, furthering both compensation and deterrence.157 The use of 
disaggregation now creates a second line of inquiry, focused upon whether 
aggregation mechanisms operate to generate optimal results when employed as 
default rules against which parties bargain—rather than as mere ends in 
themselves. 
Second, parties are crafting systems designed to expand the pool of 
resources available for private division between the parties by removing those 
systemic features designed to further the public’s interest. The question of 
which of disaggregation’s alterations are normatively desirable thus implicates 
fundamental questions about the dual public-private role of private rights of 
action as mechanisms for the enforcement of public interests. 
A. The Compensatory Function of Law 
While the savings inherent to disaggregation are a universal driver in its 




 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 914–16 & n.2 (querying whether any law review existed that had not 
published an article on class actions).  
 
157
 See Nagareda, supra note 20, at 750–51, 754. 
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mechanisms, creating different structures and potential dysfunctions. In theory, 
disaggregative systems can offer near-perfect compensation and deterrence, 
through streamlined, individualized determinations of damages and the 
elimination of litigation costs that distort both compensation and deterrence. 
Yet, in the shadow of aggregation, defendants are not paying the net expected 
liability to each plaintiff. Contrary to the existing literature on these 
mechanisms,158 I argue that bidirectional dislocations exist and identify these 
competing pressures’ impact in shifting compensation away from the value of 
the expected legal recovery. 
1. Pure Procedural Streamlining 
Predispute disaggregation provisions are most common where the 
defendant anticipates aggregate litigation brought by a handful of plaintiffs, 
with whom the company has a contractual relationship, on a claim that the 
company believes few class members would choose to pursue individually. For 
these defendants, supercompensation can be offered given the anticipated cost 
savings generated by avoiding a de facto mandatory class. These anticipated 
savings are typically so great that the company is willing to streamline 
procedure, realizing that even if the resulting award is erroneous it will be 
limited to just a single plaintiff.159 This observation is particularly important as 
it reverses the unique asymmetric settlement pressures of aggregation upon 
defendants.160 Equally important, plaintiffs are substantially returned to the 
world of single-plaintiff litigation, bearing the obligation to establish all 
elements of their stated claim and damages. These new dynamics give rise to 
the potential for bidirectional deviations from optimal compensation. 
In the predispute disaggregation context, terms have often been more 
favorable to claimants than required by law, as exemplified by the combination 
of supercompensation and fee shifting with procedural streamlining 
incorporated in the provision in Concepcion, profiled in Part II.161 But, as 




 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 24; Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 154. 
 
159
 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (“Informal [arbitration] 
procedures do of course have a cost: The absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will 
go uncorrected. Defendants are willing to accept the costs of these errors in arbitration, since their impact is 
limited to the size of individual disputes, and presumably outweighed by savings from avoiding the courts.”). 
 
160
 See id. (“Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into 
settling questionable claims.”). 
 
161
 See supra notes 143–52. 
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requirements for enforcement become clear, the provisions’ contours should 
rationally be determined by a combination of market functioning and cost.162 
As I have argued elsewhere, predispute procedural terms are uniquely 
susceptible to market failure, as contrasted with substantive terms.163 This 
dynamic results from the rational decision by recipients of form terms to not 
bear information costs.164 This dynamic occurs because the cost of studying the 
term would exceed the potential benefit or cost of these contract terms as 
adjusted for probability and magnitude of expected risk.165 The full analysis is 
complex, but the underlying logic is familiar: if it would cost $250 to retain an 
attorney to advise on whether a procedural clause accompanying a $20 printer 
cartridge is fair, the consumer will not seek legal counsel.166 As a result, 
individuals cannot properly price procedural terms.167 This rational risk-taking 
and resulting market failure should trigger a race to the bottom for corporations 
with respect to these terms—decreasing the extent to which compensation or 
terms offered favor claimants—although, as I discuss below, there are limits to 
this race.168 
In the shadow of this market failure, private forums have a structural 
incentive to favor the repeat-player drafting party.169 The risk of institutional 
capture encompasses both the crafting of procedural rules and the selection of 
particular arbitrators.170 The public identification of the institutions that favor 
corporate repeat players over those whose business model focuses upon 




 For a discussion of current doctrinal trends in lower courts, see Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with 
Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2012). 
 
163
 See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 755–64 (2011). 
 
164
 Id. at 758–59. 
 
165
 See id. at 759. 
 
166
 See id. 
 
167
 See id. at 757. For a discussion of the frequency of these form contracts, see Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003) 
(noting that “nearly all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven”); and W. David Slawson, 
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) 
(estimating that more than ninety-nine percent of contracts are based upon form terms). 
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 See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: 




 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1174–75 (2009) 
(detailing concern with repeat-player bias). 
 
170
 See Dodge, supra note 163, at 742 (discussing forms of institutional capture in arbitration, litigation, 
and the crafting of substantive law); Gilles, supra note 32, at 410–12 (discussing repeat-player leverage in the 
context of institutions’ class arbitration policies). 
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not distinguish institutional bias from a selection bias in the underlying cases—
a phenomenon exaggerated and further contaminated by the likelihood of 
settlement.171 To the extent that structural biases promote some degree of bias 
toward the drafting party, this may impact the likelihood of a finding of 
liability as well as the amount of compensation awarded.172 Thus, while the 
aggregate determination of compensation introduced allocational error,173 
privatized disaggregation risks a different type of error—bias in the underlying 
determination of the case. 
To be clear, having served as both counsel in arbitration and as an 
arbitrator, I do not believe that all or even many arbitrators are consciously or 
unconsciously biased, nor are all arbitral institutions. Instead, my claim is that 
the presence of a minority of bad actors creates pressure upon those that prefer 
to operate in a fair system, particularly to the extent that the selection of an 
arbitral forum is a low-salience or even nonsalient term for consumers.174 
Corporations that take advantage of procedural market failure are able to use 
these gains to provide more generous salient terms, or improve profits—
creating pressure upon other corporations that incentivizes a race to the 
bottom.175 
Thus, one set of pressures suggests the potential for undercompensation, 
resulting from the increased probability of market failure. This assertion is not 
to say that all terms facially beneficial to the nondrafting party will be phased 
out with the clarification of precedent and transition to a more pure market 
system. To the contrary, mutually beneficial terms are likely to continue. For 
example, the streamlining of procedure is a benefit to not only the plaintiff, but 
the defendant as well. Likewise, offers of supercompensation are typically 




 See Resnik, supra note 16, at 109–11 (discussing the delay in identifying the National Arbitration 
Forum as a potentially biased forum, in which repeat players “won virtually all the cases”). 
 
172
 See Miles B. Farmer, Note, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 
YALE L.J. 2346, 2356–57 (2012) (discussing systemic biases in favor of repeat players and resulting impacts 
upon substantive outcomes). 
 
173
 See supra Part II.A. 
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 While a robust literature discusses this market failure, the best evidence of how widespread this 
phenomenon is may well be its appearance at the center of a South Park episode’s plotline. Compare Dodge, 
supra note 163, at 755–64, 767 (reviewing literature supporting a conception of “ex ante exceptionalism” with 
respect to market failure for procedural terms in form contracts), with South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD 
(Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011), available at http://www.southparkstudios.com/full-
episodes/s15e01-humancentipad (focusing upon the unintended consequence of Kyle Broflovski’s agreement 
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 See Dodge, supra note 163, at 760–61. 
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by corporate counsel. Corporations are therefore likely to continue to offer 
these terms, as they suggest fairness and legitimacy to those consumers who 
review the policy, yet are cost neutral or even favorable to the corporation. 
A second set of pressures weighs in the opposite situation, pressing the 
defendant to agree to provide supercompensation—compensation in excess of 
that which would be objectively determined to be due. For many small-value 
claims, removing the specter of aggregation has the impact of making the 
claim one in which the costs of defense exceed the alleged liability. The cost-
shifting provisions required to demonstrate that the procedural alterations have 
not prevented the vindication of the underlying substantive law exacerbate this 
dynamic. A company should rationally opt to settle these cases rather than bear 
the costs of defense—even for claims that it believes are meritless.176 
There is an outer limit imposed on this settlement principle—where the 
corporation expects that offering quick settlement will cause an increase in the 
number of claims sufficient to outweigh the cost savings. Yet this will 
frequently remain an outer limit and not the ordinary corporate response, 
because the small amount in dispute not only incentivizes the company to 
rationally settle but also will disincentivize many potential claimants from 
filing claims given the opportunity cost even streamlined litigation entails.177 
Taken together, these competing tensions result in a substantial shift in the 
dynamics of compensation, distinctly different from those of either single-
plaintiff or aggregate litigation. In contrast to aggregation, predispute waivers 
of aggregation typically yield full compensation for those who file claims—in 
many ways harkening back to the compensation available in the single-plaintiff 
system. Yet, in order to survive judicial scrutiny, these provisions typically 
decrease the direct costs of pursuing these claims, converting claims whose 
direct costs would outweigh the relief available in the single-plaintiff litigation 
system into viable, compensable claims. Thus, the net compensation available 
for the claimant in disaggregation is theoretically superior to that of either of 
the existing public litigation mechanisms. 
However, streamlining and cost shifting have the consequence of 
discouraging the meaningful assessment of the merits of the claim, as the game 
is frequently not worth the candle for the defendants. As a result, corporations 




 See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 1378. 
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 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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bear the greater costs of even streamlined merits determination. Moreover, in 
cases of sufficient monetary value, where contesting the claim is worthwhile, 
the question is whether market failure will encourage the defendant’s selection 
of a forum susceptible to repeat-player bias. 
This also suggests the limits of disaggregation via streamlining. Well-
drafted predispute provisions should carve out anticipated claims where the 
corporation would prefer to reduce the risk of inconsistent judgments or 
seriatim lawsuits—for example, antitrust objections to mergers are often better 
addressed in aggregate litigation.178 
Similarly, the value of disaggregative streamlining provisions is decreased 
with respect to claims that most victims will choose to bring even in a single-
plaintiff format—for example, wrongful death claims. The disaggregation 
provision would in these cases yield a relativistic benefit for the corporation by 
returning to the investment asymmetries of the pre–Rule 23 world. However, 
the expansion of contractual aggregation, joint representation agreements, and 
MDL mitigate the benefit the corporation is likely to receive—and in turn 
reduce the joint gains available for division that are the foundation of private 
disaggregative mechanisms. 
2. Substantive Streamlining 
Postdispute disaggregation typically occurs where the costs of aggregate 
litigation, in both delay and added procedural checks, exceed the differential in 
aggregate settlement values, such that the defendant can propose a settlement 
superior for all parties as contrasted with the default of aggregation.179 But, 
given this win-win potential, why do some settlement offers succeed where 





 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting certiorari to review the 
Second Circuit’s invalidation of a class arbitration waiver in the context of federal antitrust allegations). 
 
179
 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (“‘The most objectionable aspects of 
asbestos litigation can be briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long 
delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed the 
victims’ recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future 
claimants may lose altogether.’” (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2–3 (1991))); see also David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve 
Litigation Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1727 (2005) (noting that, even in settlement, “on average, it costs 
approximately one dollar in legal expenses for the legal system to transfer one dollar from a defendant to a 
plaintiff”).  
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When confronted with angry Super Bowl ticketholders denied seats at the 
game, the NFL unilaterally offered ticketholders the choice of (a) cash plus a 
ticket to the next Super Bowl, (b) a ticket to a future Super Bowl plus airfare 
and a hotel, or (c) a pure cash payout of either $5,000 as a lump sum or a 
greater amount with documentation of expenses.180 
In the wake of the Concordia shipwreck, the cruise line made a similar 
offer to surviving passengers: a flat rate payment of around $14,500, in 
addition to reimbursement of their tickets, cost of flights home, and other 
documented expenses incurred in Italy in the days following the wreck.181 The 
amount of the settlement was carefully negotiated at arm’s length with 
prominent consumer groups, in contrast to the NFL offer’s unilaterally set 
terms.182 
Given the enhanced procedural legitimacy in the Concordia offer, what 
factors prompted the ticketholders to accept the NFL settlement183 while 
hundreds of passengers have filed suit rather than accept the arm’s length 
Concordia settlement?184 And equally important, what does this suggest about 
the viability and limits of postdispute disaggregative offers as a compensation 
mechanism? 
Disaggregative settlement offers typically seek to generate joint gains 
through elimination of contested litigation and, in turn, the necessity of 
plaintiffs’ counsel. Yet, without legal counsel to educate claimants about their 
legal rights, the legal inquiry into liability and damages is transformed into an 
individualized assessment of the acceptability of the settlement offer, largely 
defined by subjective perceptions of fairness as defined by each victim. 
This transformation suggests three limitations upon the types of disputes 




 See Stahl, supra note 121. 
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 See Pianigiani, supra note 120. 
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 See Gary Mihoces, Judge: Cowboys Off the Hook in Super Bowl XLV Seat Fiasco, USA TODAY (July 
19, 2012, 9:35 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/story/2012-07-19/dallas-super-bowl-
lawsuit/56347366/1 (noting that most fans accepted the NFL’s settlement offer rather than participate in the 
class action litigation). 
 
184
 See Nadeau, supra note 182 (describing survivors’ reasons for hiring counsel for a class action lawsuit 
rather than accept the settlement offer). 
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First, disaggregative offers may yield low participation rates where 
potential claimants, without the aid of counsel, cannot accurately ascertain the 
legally available compensation. In the NFL settlement, individual parties could 
easily determine their damages—indeed, they possessed superior information 
on this point as contrasted with either the defendant or the putative class’s 
counsel.185 
But in other circumstances, victims may not be able to accurately assess the 
settlement’s compensation as against legal damages. Like the Super Bowl 
ticketholders, the shipwreck victims had superior knowledge as to their out-of-
pocket expenses related to the wreck.186 But, while they knew of the terror they 
suffered during the shipwreck and the psychological damage many reported in 
the weeks and months that followed, most were unlikely to know the legal 
value of these harms.187 Thus, while in many cases, claimants will have 
superior knowledge of the facts underlying their particular claims, they may 
lack the expertise to understand the value of these claims. 
Second, the lack of plaintiffs’ counsel may prevent the effective education 
of potential claimants as to legal barriers to their recovery. Because the victims 
do not know how to calculate their damages, they may overestimate their likely 
recovery. But, it may also be the case that the victims do not properly 
understand the procedural hurdles or substantive problems with the merits of 
their case. As a result, even in cases where the parties can both easily agree on 
the value of damages, if the defendant seeks to reduce the compensation to 
adjust for the likelihood it would succeed in its defense, victims may believe 
the offer is unfair and refuse to participate. 
As a result, defendants may not receive substantial participation where they 
seek a risk premium or deduction for statutory or contractual limits upon 
damages. Unlike the NFL offer, which was made at the top of the range of 
available damages without regard for uncertainty surrounding the liability 
phase,188 the Concordia settlement was made in the shadow of legal limitations 
on recovery. The cruise line passengers had agreed to a forum selection clause 




 See Stahl, supra note 121. 
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burdens, likely award less compensation than American courts, and would 
require the posting of a judiciary tax.189 
In addition, the cruise company alleged that indemnification limits made 
the proposed settlement more generous than the relief available in court, even 
though it was a substantial diminution as against the typical American 
judgment for such a claim.190 In announcing the claim, the company pointed 
out that the offer exceeded the indemnification limits—although it did not state 
what those amounts were, nor whether these were contractual or statutory 
limits.191 The company has made public that the wrongful death liability will 
be capped at $75,000, in contrast to the $2–$5 million typical in airplane 
fatalities.192 The would-be defendant struggled to gain credibility with the 
passengers and, in turn, to educate them as to the merits of the deal. Thus, not 
having class counsel created a substantial void in terms of both legitimacy and, 
in turn, persuading the victims to participate in the settlement. 
Third, disaggregative mechanisms are likely to be most effective for mid-
sized claims: small-value claims will have payout offers so small that few 
participants are willing to apply for compensation, while large-value claims 
may incentivize would-be plaintiffs’ counsel to take a public stance in 
opposition to the deal, suggesting that they can obtain superior 
compensation.193 Indeed, in the Concordia settlement, the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
urging a class action were publicly asserting that all of the contractual forum 
selection and liability-limiting provisions would be invalidated.194 
Implicit in this discussion is the recognition that while these structural 
features can act as barriers to settlement, they can also shift the substantive 
content of the settlement offer. In a traditional litigation paradigm, settlement 
occurs where the differential between the parties’ expected outcome at trial is 
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continuing litigation exceed the projected gain for the parties.195 Put another 
way, litigation costs are rationally borne by parties only to the extent that they 
generate a convergence in expected outcomes. This convergence is essential to 
settlement, as it is necessary to the creation of a zone of potential agreement—
the settlement range, in which the plaintiff’s projected net outcome at trial 
becomes less than the defendant’s projected net outcome at trial.196 
Postdispute disaggregative devices are designed to decrease litigation costs, 
often through a defendant conceding liability on a particular substantive issue. 
Such a concession is rational where the defendant believes it is likely to be 
found guilty, such that the continuation of litigation is unlikely to yield a 
decrease in liability, but will certainly generate additional costs. But it can also 
result where the substantive issue is one whose determination is likely to cost 
more than the liability at stake—making it a negative-value defense. The 
addition of benefits from a public relations perspective of taking responsibility 
or the appearance of doing the right thing, and the provision of closure to the 
market, can add further value to early settlement—further increasing the 
amount of compensation that can be paid before exceeding the projected net 
expense of proceeding through trial. 
For plaintiffs, the decrease in litigation costs and increased present value of 
a settlement should likewise result in a decrease in the compensation 
demanded, creating a bidirectional expansion of the zone of potential 
agreement between the parties based upon these net savings. However, a 
number of factors counterbalance this diminution in settlement value. 
While claimants may have superior information about their individual 
damages, in many cases the defendant will have superior information about its 
liability for the underlying event at issue. Typically this information 
asymmetry is resolved through discovery, but most disaggregative mechanisms 
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But given this information asymmetry, the defendant’s offer of settlement 
suggests an increased likelihood of guilt and thus does not trigger a risk 
premium in the form of decreased compensation. Put another way, the cost 
savings generated through avoidance of litigation costs should rationally be 
distributed between the two parties on the basis of bargaining power. Yet 
without counsel to educate victims as to the uncertainty with respect to the 
merits of a case and the legal valuation of their damages, defendants typically 
offer full compensation in order to obtain claimants’ participation.198 The lack 
of knowledge and the opt-in nature of postdispute disaggregation essentially 
shift bargaining power in favor of the claimants. 
For defendants to rationally agree to pay full compensation, the costs of 
litigation must exceed the expected value of the defenses they would raise, 
discounted for probability of success of those defenses. For defendants whose 
internal investigation has revealed guilt, disaggregative settlement offers clear 
benefits. But, as exemplified by the NFL settlement, even those defendants 
whose guilt is far from certain are offering settlements that do not just match 
but exceed that available by law.199 
This trend toward overcompensation is remarkable, insofar as it reveals that 
aggregation essentially serves as a tax upon defendants. Confronted with a 
class action, defendants’ litigation costs and indirect losses from the 
uncertainty mass claims generate are so great that even where substantial 
questions exist on the merits, the defendant may still find it cheaper to pay 
100% (or more) of damages rather than litigate. 
Because disaggregative settlements are contract based, each claimant must 
affirmatively sign a settlement agreement. To the extent that only a fraction of 
the victims are expected to file a claim, these monies can be redeployed toward 
offering enhanced compensation to those that do file. This creates a second 
basis for funding offers of supercompensation, which lies not in the reduction 
of litigation costs, but in a redistribution of compensation from those who do 
not decide to file claims to those who do. 
But dislocations can also operate in the opposite direction. Although early 
settlement offers have thus far included this supercompensation premium to 
 
that any individuals or businesses in regions affected by the oil spill could file claims with or without an 
attorney and describing the minimal documentation required as proof). 
 
198
 See notes 131–35 and accompanying text. But see Ackerman, supra note 13, at 161–65; Mullenix, 
supra note 32, at 854–59. 
 
199
 See Stahl, supra note 121. 
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plaintiffs, as these processes gain increased acceptance and legitimacy, this 
premium may decrease. Indeed, both the September 11th Fund and the GCCF 
obtained the participation of individuals who received awards less than those 
available under tort law.200 Put another way, despite the promise of 
disaggregation, the efficiencies gained can be utilized to reduce the payout of 
compensatory damages, shifting the division of the joint gains in favor of the 
defendant. For example, an offer of only 80% of damages is still objectively 
superior to an award contested in litigation, given the attorneys’ fees, related 
costs, and time value of money—even before one accounts for the opportunity 
cost of delay for those plaintiffs facing unemployment, medical bills, 
foreclosure, tuition payments for children in college, or any of the other 
economic realities that might cause a personal preference for immediate 
payment. 
To the extent that individuals rationally accept these offers, it risks 
underdeterrence by not requiring corporations to bear the externalities of their 
actions. It also reduces the effectiveness of aggregation for others and may 
even prevent formation of meaningful aggregation, such that parties effectively 
revert to the pre–Rule 23 asymmetries and irremediable claims if they refuse 
the disaggregative offer. 
While in a theoretical sense plaintiffs acting in a unified manner could 
refuse the offer, this bargaining sophistication is somewhat atypical, 
particularly among a diffuse group of plaintiffs acting independently. As 
plaintiffs begin to accept the offer as superior to the litigation alternative, the 
aggregation benefits for those who do not opt into the fund begin to dissipate, 
increasing the pro-rata cost of litigation and thus decreasing the benefit to 
remaining in the class action. This strategy allows the defendant to capture the 
zone of potential agreement created by the avoided litigation costs. This may 
seem a minor criticism until one considers that the ratio between the 




 See BDO CONSULTING, BDO USA, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY: REPORT OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 10, 68, 76 (2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/gccf-rpt-find-obs.pdf (DOJ-commissioned report); 
Ackerman, supra note 13, at 161–65; Mullenix, supra note 32, at 854–59; David F. Partlett & Russell L. 




 See Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE L.J. 813, 
820–21 (1989) (collecting studies).  
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in some cases legal fees actually exceed compensation202—allowing a 
substantial downward departure in compensation from the actual damages 
suffered. 
Likewise, complexity generates a lack of transparency, providing 
opportunities for the defendant to capture gain. In the NFL and Concordia 
settlements, the determinations of eligibility and amount of damages were 
rather straightforward. Claims administrators could relatively easily determine 
who held an affected ticket or had been on the ship, and then review the 
receipts submitted to determine the total amount owed. But where these 
determinations are less clear—for example, in BP’s GCCF, the calculation of 
projected damages for businesses in the midst of a recession—then the design 
of the dispute resolution system and selection of a neutral have a far greater 
effect on the ultimate value of the payout in terms of both legitimacy and likely 
participation. 
The nature of privatization typically places defendants in the role of 
initiators of disaggregation and in turn systems designers. With defendants 
unilaterally selecting the third-party neutral, there is a natural suspicion of bias, 
as exemplified by the challenges to the GCCF, notwithstanding the selection of 
Ken Feinberg, the special master of the September 11th Fund.203 But for 
potential claimants, the information costs associated with investigating the 
neutrality of the proposed neutral will likely exceed the value of the 
information—particularly given the lack of transparency in arbitration, 
notwithstanding reporting requirements.204 Indeed, at present there is a lack of 
any such reporting requirements on these very new tribunals, and it is difficult 
to conceive of how such a report would be formulated. By definition, the 
question is not the binary one of liability, but one of relative compensation—
thus requiring a third party to independently assess the claims to determine 




 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (quoting Report of the Judicial 
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 2–3 (Mar. 1991)) (noting that the transaction costs 
exceeded the recovery in the asbestos cases by a 2-to-1 ratio). 
 
203
 See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 819–21. 
 
204
 See Resnik, supra note 16, at 108 (“The constitutional obligations of ‘open courts’ have produced a 
wealth of data on judges’ salaries, court budgets, case proceedings, and outcomes. In contrast, private dispute 
resolvers are left to do as they wish, subject only in a few jurisdictions, such as California, to requirements that 
arbitration providers ‘collect, publish . . . , and make available to the public’ information about parties, 
categories of disputes, time to disposition, and outcomes.”); Sternlight, supra note 42, at 1662–64; Roger J. 
Perlstadt, Comment, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1985–87 
(2002).  
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Moreover, because these funds are structured as bilateral contracts between 
the defendant and each claimant, they are relatively insulated from public 
checks. Absent a showing of fraud, unconscionability, or other basis for 
invalidation, the agreements will be enforced. Claimants would therefore 
rationally operate upon the expectation of bias in assessing the proposed terms, 
potentially triggering a race to the bottom—as purportedly occurred in the 
context of consumer arbitration with the National Arbitration Forum.205 
This suspicion may be correct even where the selected claims fund 
administrator is neutral, given the asymmetries discovered in the awards of the 
BP GCCF. As Linda Mullenix described it,  
The serious challenges that scholars have raised with regard to the 
legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund have 
even more powerful resonance in relation to the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility. . . . For those concerned with the rule of law, equity, and 
fundamental fairness, the GCCF ought to be a cause for concern.206  
Since the publication of Mullenix’s critique, the Department of Justice has 
confirmed her intuitions of systemic bias, finding in its audit of the tribunal’s 
awards that the average claimant received $8,800 less than the independent 
reviewers determined to be due, triggering aggregate payments of more than 
$64 million.207 Moreover, the waivers and releases that GCCF claimants must 
sign cover not only BP but also any other potentially liable party—a breadth 
not provided for in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 but drafted by Special Master 
Feinberg, to the advantage of BP and its potential codefendants, raising 
questions for the MDL judge about Feinberg’s impartiality.208 
Disaggregation awards compensation on an individualized basis, rather 
than backing into the compensation due from a classwide settlement agreement 
subject to pressures toward allocational error. Moreover, the joint gains from 
the avoided litigation costs and delay make possible full compensation in a 
way not possible in either the aggregate or single-plaintiff litigation systems. 
Yet, the dynamics inherent to a settlement in which claimants decide 




 See George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and Employment Arbitration 
and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 681 n.102 (2013). 
 
206
 Mullenix, supra note 32, at 825. 
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 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 140 (noting total fund payout of over $6.2 billion to 
more than 220,000 claimants). 
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 Mullenix, supra note 32, at 843–44 & n.115, 872, 888. 
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counsel create a shift from legal entitlement under the law to subjective 
willingness to accept the deal. The inherently privatized nature of this 
disaggregation provides a further basis for shifts from the optimal level of 
compensation, resulting from the rational strategic choices the parties should 
make in the shadow of aggregation. While myriad factors will determine the 
direction of this dislocation in any particular settlement, it is clear that 
disaggregation creates a new set of dysfunctions in compensation that have 
broader normative consequences for the functions of law. 
B. Optimal Enforcement and Deterrence 
The innovation of disaggregative mechanisms has been the bypassing of 
the procedural costs and delay of an aggregate determination on the classwide 
merits of the case, allowing both parties to obtain better outcomes than 
traditional aggregation. Yet, even if bypassing the merits determination is 
rational for the parties, it creates a lack of precision in determining actual 
wrongdoing: Both innocent and guilty parties may find it cheaper to pay full 
damages to those who file claims in a disaggregative proceeding than to 
proceed through class certification and summary judgment. 
Yet, unlike in class actions where the innocent defendant can negotiate a 
smaller settlement than a guilty defendant, in disaggregation there is no single 
agent to negotiate with on behalf of the plaintiff; therefore, guilty and innocent 
parties may pay substantially equal amounts to obtain plaintiffs’ participation. 
While this is a rational decision for the parties, it closes the differential 
between the two competing states of compliance and noncompliance with the 
law. As this differential creates the deterrent value of the law, the lack of 
merits-based determinations in disaggregative settlements may weaken the 
goal of deterrence. But this realization has deeper theoretical implications, 
illuminated through two concepts I term “fractional participation” and “reverse 
preference enforcement.” 
1. Fractional Participation 
Private rights have traditionally served not only the private interest in 
obtaining compensation for wrongs, but often have also functioned as a 
mechanism for the effectuation of the public’s interest in the enforcement of a 
particular right. Aggregative mechanisms sought to adjust this relationship, 
providing enhanced deterrence against a backdrop of perceived 
underenforcement of certain types of claims marked by low net compensation. 
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In this aggregative paradigm, compensation became derivative of the overall 
settlement and subject to allocational error, resulting in “rough justice” for 
class members.209 
Disaggregation upends this traditional conception. Parties are not just 
putting compensation first and allowing deterrence to follow derivatively; 
rather, they are trading enhanced compensation for decreased deterrence. 
Disaggregative mechanisms focus on improved individual compensation 
relative to both the single-plaintiff and aggregative models, but this autonomy 
often generates fractional enforcement as only a subset of victims choose to 
seek relief. The significance of this transformation cannot be overstated. 
Whereas aggregation focused on correctly assessing the total damages owed by 
the defendant but potentially erred in compensation,210 disaggregation focuses 
on the individual damages owed to each plaintiff but potentially errs in the 
determination of total damages.211 
Disaggregation raises fundamental questions about how to define optimal 
enforcement and deterrence. Some will likely view this structure as obtaining 
the correct level of deterrence, providing compensation to those aggrieved 
enough to file a claim in a broader context of streamlining that generates joint 
gains for both parties—while preventing the frivolous suits based upon alleged 
wrongs recognized by only a few class members.212 Others will likely view this 
structure as effectively precluding enforcement for small-value claims, as there 
does remain some opportunity cost or burden even in the most streamlined 
system. Claimants may fail to file claims even for guaranteed money if 
“claiming the $30.22 were to involve filling out many forms that require 
technical legal knowledge or waiting at great length while a call is placed on 
hold.”213 
Disaggregation’s instrumental impact is thus best understood by bifurcating 
the private from the public interest. The small-value harms frequently the 
subjects of predispute disaggregation are the types of slights ordinarily borne 




 See supra Part I. 
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 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
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 Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751–53 (2011). 
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fanatic sues for $30.”214 Beyond making available a small-claims-court forum, 
our legal system does not aggressively facilitate the pursuit of these claims, 
recognizing the public resource investment as not justified by the benefit. 
In contrast, where these small harms occur on a mass-claims basis, the legal 
system does recognize the necessity of creating an enforcement mechanism to 
correct the incentive for wrongdoing. But the harm to the individual plaintiff 
remains unchanged. Aggregate settlements of these small-value claims 
historically have not provided individual compensation, as the costs of 
administration would exceed the payment.215 Instead, the monies recovered are 
often donated to a charitable purpose through a cy pres distribution.216 Taken 
together, this suggests that in these low-value cases the true aim for both the 
class counsel and the court approving the settlement is deterrence. 
Compensation is simply a positive externality of the process, where it is 
possible. 
In disaggregation’s shadow, legislatures can no longer presume that the 
creation of a private right of action will be a substantial mechanism for 
effectuating enforcement of the underlying substantive law. Instead, the costs 
of aggregation can be leveraged to create a dynamic in which those plaintiffs 
willing to seek compensation are overcompensated, while the defendant is able 
to benefit from fractional enforcement—making all parties better off as 
contrasted with aggregation, but not fulfilling the public interest.217 If the 
company is unsuccessful in obtaining a predispute aggregation waiver, then the 
case remains in the default litigation system with the potential for aggregate 




 Id. (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual 
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 
(7th Cir. 2004))). 
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 See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990) (“When a 
class action involves a large number of class members but only a small individual recovery, the cost of 
separately proving and distributing each class member’s damages may so outweigh the potential recovery that 
the class action becomes unfeasible.”); Notice of Class Action, Proposed Settlement, and Hearing at 4, 
Settlement Recovery Ctr. v. ValueClick, Inc., No. CV-02638-FMC-(CTx) (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2008), available 
at http://www.affiliatefairplay.com/service/images/post/agreement_of_settlement.pdf (“Recognizing that 
administration costs for low-value payments can greatly exceed the value of these payments, no payment will 
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the legislator, the spectrum of potential dispute resolution mechanisms and 
their consequence for the level of deterrence obtained makes it impossible to 
precisely calculate the deterrent effect a private right of action will obtain. 
2. Reverse Preference Enforcement 
As with predispute waivers of aggregation, postdispute offers of settlement 
are likely to obtain only fractional participation. In contrast to predispute 
waivers that completely prohibit formal aggregation, postdispute settlement 
operates in the shadow of aggregation. Successful settlement offers will 
effectively preclude aggregation, but low participation rates allow aggregation 
to continue. Rejection of the settlement may reflect a belief that the offer was 
too small for the harm caused.218 But it might also reflect a belief that the 
purported wrong was not a wrong at all or not worth pursuing, particularly in 
cases of alleged mislabeling or other types of false advertising. To the extent 
that low participation rates are a populist rejection of the pending litigation’s 
substantive claim, it creates the paradox of “reverse preference enforcement.” 
The strongest claims de facto preclude aggregation as most claimants 
participate in the settlement, while the weakest claims allow the pursuit of 
aggregation and create a de facto mandatory class. 
The court’s response to attempts to aggregate in the shadow of a 
postdispute disaggregative settlement offer can be expected to further alter the 
settlement dynamics. Facially pro-plaintiff decisions with respect to class 
action procedure have at times harmed the long-term recovery of victims in 
unrelated cases, as defendants reduce their settlement offers in response to the 
perceived degree of closure they receive. For example, where courts have 
allowed plaintiffs to reopen deals later determined to be disadvantageous to 
plaintiffs, but not defendants, this creates a one-way ratchet effect that should 
decrease the settlement values.219 
The courts’ response to fractional participation may operate in much the 




 See, e.g., Pianigiani, supra note 120 (quoting a representative of a consumer group who described the 
settlement offered by Costa Cruises as “ridiculous and disproportionate for the damage suffered” (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
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 See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 129–
31 (2009) (discussing the original Agent Orange class action settlement, the court’s decision to grant a 
collateral attack on the settlement resulting in a new round of payouts by the defendant, as undermining the 
degree of closure received by defendants and thus reducing the amount rational defendants should be willing 
to pay in future settlements as a result of this shift in the risk premium). 
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of nonparticipants, the defendant must anticipate the potential for a low 
participation rate and the costs attending such litigation. Rather than allocating 
the cost savings of avoided litigation entirely to the settlement, the defendant 
should rationally make offers reflective only of the marginal cost of an 
additional absent class member in the suit—a nominal cost, to be sure. Thus, 
the creation of a seemingly pro-plaintiff doctrine permitting suit on behalf of 
those who do not participate in the private settlement may have the impact of 
reducing settlement offers to those willing to seek compensation. 
Having identified the shadow aggregation may cast over disaggregation, 
the next section turns to exploring the problems this creates for the parties’ 
private ordering and the second-generation dysfunctions created by attempts of 
the courts to correct those problems. 
C. Process Function and Legitimacy Values 
1. First-Level Dysfunction: Defendants as Systems Designers 
No disaggregative mechanism is available within our default civil 
procedure system. As a result, if the parties prefer disaggregation, they must 
privately create the system. Typically the corporate defendant has served as the 
systems designer. Pre-dispute, the corporation includes an arbitration or 
dispute resolution clause in its form contracts.220 Post-dispute, the corporation 
will typically propose a settlement or resolution process, in which interested 
claimants may participate.221 As systems designer, the corporation is then able 
to select the type of dispute resolution system, craft the procedural rules, 
decide what tradeoff to make as between accuracy and cost in light of the 
anticipated magnitude and complexity of claims, and select the neutral or 
administering body. The role of systems designer is thus a powerful one, 
capable of dramatically shifting the bargaining power of the parties and the 
ability to exit in cases of perceived unfairness.222 Moreover, by shifting 




 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
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 See generally NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING 
DISPUTES (2013) (explaining, through case studies and other examples, how to design and implement an 
effective alternative dispute resolution system). 
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law, the designer can substantially impact the degree of deterrence the private 
right of action will provide.223 
This power can often be used to design systems that are optimal for all 
parties involved, enhancing compliance with the underlying law, and even 
achieving transformative or cathartic ends that the litigation system itself may 
not obtain. The new mechanisms, procedural innovation, and, more broadly, 
dispute systems design techniques resulting from the grassroots 
experimentation with ADR have been lauded for their improved results for 
parties across a broad spectrum of methodological approaches—from law and 
economics extolling the ability to streamline costs and improve compliance 
with substantive terms224 to those focused on the increased party satisfaction 
and transformative effects alternative processes can generate.225 
But, the public courts serve an essential function in the democratic system, 
from ensuring the public accountability of the courts to guaranteeing that the 
necessary procedural protections are in place for the obtainment of remedies, 
exemplified most prominently by the Civil Gideon movement of the past 
century.226 The transformation of procedure from public rules set to ensure a 
fair day in court to mere default rules subject to private ordering thus risks 
thinning “the substance of procedural due process.”227 Indeed, to the extent that 
corporations are able to set the rules of procedure, they can shift the deterrent 
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2. Second-Level Dysfunction: Public Checks upon Disaggregation 
Because disaggregative mechanisms are inherently contractual, the existing 
doctrine has generally placed minimal checks upon their usage. By looking at 
these mechanisms as a unified system, rather than isolated examples, a number 
of observations become apparent that have thus far been lurking within the 
shadows of our scholarship and doctrine. 
As a general matter, disaggregative mechanisms are subject to the basic 
rules of contract and the defenses appurtenant thereto. With respect to 
predispute procedural modifications, the Supreme Court has created an 
additional protection, given the ability of alterations to undermine deterrence: 
procedural modification cannot thwart the substantive enforcement of law.228 
Of course, in practice, the majority has focused on whether a person could 
bring a claim, if so inclined, seemingly disregarding the opportunity cost of 
low-net-value claims, to the dismay of the dissenters.229 The true constraints 
imposed upon corporations’ use of disaggregation are then not the direct 
prohibitions of the doctrine, but the pragmatic constraints upon closure that 
operate in its shadow.230 
Predispute disaggregation is available only to contracting parties. 
Defendants lacking a contractual relationship with their accusers, as is the case 
with many tort claims, cannot take advantage of predispute disaggregation 
agreements.  
This naturally arising dichotomy has some intuitive appeal: where 
parties are entering into a contractual relationship, they have the 
opportunity to assess the other’s reputation and their own interests 
and decide upon the level of assurance they prefer for their 




 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–48 (2011); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
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Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; and 
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liability-inducing event, ostensibly without the opportunity for due 
diligence, a stronger need for state protection is apparent.231 
Postdispute disaggregation now appears to be on the precipice of a similar 
bifurcation. In recent years, corporations have begun routinely recalling 
products, creating refund mechanisms, or otherwise offering the relief that 
would potentially be—or, perhaps more concerning, is already being—sought 
by a class action. In the last year, both the Seventh Circuit and Tenth Circuit 
have held that this prevents the pursuit of the class action.232 In Winzler v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, the plaintiff brought a state law claim against Toyota 
alleging that the Toyota Corolla and Toyota Corolla Matrix had “defective 
‘Engine Control Modules,’” which caused the cars to stall with no warning.233 
The court held that the voluntary recall filed with the applicable government 
agency rendered moot a class action because the recall had already provided 
the entire remedy to which the class members would be entitled.234 
In Aqua Dots, the defendants manufactured a toy consisting of small, 
brightly colored beads; several children ingested the beads and became 
severely ill.235 The court held that the class could not be certified following a 
voluntary recall because the Rule 23(a) requirement of adequacy could not be 
met. “A representative who proposes that high transaction costs (notice and 
attorneys’ fees) be incurred at the class members’ expense to obtain a refund 
that is already on offer is not adequately protecting the class members’ 
interests,” notwithstanding the additional request of punitive damages as these 
damages would be based upon unmanageable questions of state law.236 As 
Judge Easterbrook noted, the “substantial costs of the legal process” offered 
little value as “plaintiffs could have had refunds—and still can have them 
today.”237 Moreover, there was little reason to believe the court’s notice 
campaign would be more effective than that of the corporation—most 
consumers had returned the product, there were no complaints by the 
governing agency, and it was likely that many of the unreturned products had 
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In a world of fractional enforcement, where a large portion of the alleged 
victims may never take any action either in support of or opposition to any 
settlement offer, this substantially shifts the overall cost of a violation to the 
corporation. The income level of consumers, amount of the purchase, and 
extent of targeted notice will be among the myriad factors impacting the 
participation rate in such a program. By their nature, these programs are 
typically quietly administered and participation information is rarely disclosed, 
but the range of ratios of claims form return rates, spanning from 1:5 to 1:50, 
in consumer class actions suggests the magnitude of the shift in enforcement 
these programs may yield.239 Thus, the emerging trend within the doctrine has 
the effect of allowing the defendant to avoid a class action not only before, but 
also after the dispute arises. 
Of course, embedded within this emerging doctrine are also its limits. But 
to understand these limits, we must understand the preclusive effect of the 
disaggregative settlement on participating and nonparticipating victims. As 
lawyers, it seems self-evident that a company offering compensation would 
demand a waiver in exchange. In these cases, the settlement agreement is like 
any other single-plaintiff settlement, and can be revisited only upon narrow 
grounds such as fraud. 
But at times, corporations offer compensation without demanding 
closure—perhaps most commonly to comply with a statutory requirement, to 
reduce management costs with very low value claims, to increase the 
legitimacy of the offer and rate of participation in the program, or for a public 
relations benefit.240 In these situations, the company risks a subsequent suit 
alleging insufficiency of compensation and seeking the gap between the 
compensation paid and the total amount available by law. Because these 
voluntary payments will offset against any award, if the compensation offer is 
relatively accurate, even with a number of participants, the differential 
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The closure problem then is not typically focused on participants, but on 
nonparticipants. Under the emerging precedent, if full compensation has been 
offered, then the class action is not seeking anything not already available to 
the nonparticipants. In such a case, individuals are of course not precluded 
from seeking individual adjudication or binding together to request an MDL. 
But, these functionally remain opt-in mechanisms requiring the individual to 
file a claim—in contrast to the class action, where all absent class members are 
presumptively included and must affirmatively opt out of the class. Thus, to 
obtain the aggregation benefits of a class action, successful plaintiffs’ counsel 
will need to argue that the disaggregative mechanism is overlooking some 
element of damages or is undervaluing those damages. 
D. Constitutional Actors and Disaggregative Mechanisms 
Public attempts to restrict disaggregative mechanisms have ebbed and 
flowed among the constitutional branches over time. With respect to 
arbitration, a vast literature has arisen addressing the shift from congressional 
support and judicial hostility at the time of the Federal Arbitration Act.242 More 
recently, arbitration fairness acts, seeking to restrict predispute arbitration 
provisions in consumer and employment agreements, have become perennial 
proposals in the federal legislature.243 But the judiciary has become more 
supportive of procedural private ordering, including arbitration, even in cases 
in which it undermines the enforcement of substantive law.244 
My goal in this section is not to recapitulate this literature. Instead, it 
focuses upon the undertheorized problem of public checks upon postdispute 
disaggregation. While Congress could restrict the ability of the parties to enter 
into bilateral settlements, these provisions are not widespread.245 The primary 
form of check has therefore been judicial. Again, because the settlements are 
constructed as individual settlements, the judiciary has few tools to directly 
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stems from its willingness or refusal to certify a class action notwithstanding 
the existence of a settlement offer.246 
But what does this transition look like when a private fund is replaced with 
a judicially approved class settlement? The most prominent example—and one 
that exemplifies the problems with both private disaggregative tribunals and 
the oversight provided by the backstop of aggregation—is the response to the 
Deepwater Horizon rig’s explosion.247 
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, transforming the 
Gulf Coast economy.248 The resulting oil spill continued for three months, 
releasing millions of gallons of oil, which forced the prohibition of fishing 
through large swaths of the Gulf of Mexico, while coastal tourism collapsed.249 
The secondary effects of these economic losses threatened even greater 
dislocations and potential economic collapse. 
As the “responsible party” for the oil spill, BP had a statutory duty under 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to “establish a procedure for the payment or 
settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.”250 Initially, this 
obligation was satisfied through an ad hoc claims administration process.251 
But based upon discussions with congressional officials and the President, BP 
replaced its ad hoc system with an “Independent Claims Facility,” later named 
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.252 
The GCCF had the potential to generate value for all of the stakeholders. 
For BP, the Fund’s structure permitted it to make payments in tranches over 
the course of years, allowing for longitudinal cost spreading.253 While the first 
$3 billion payment came from BP’s cash reserves, the remaining $17 billion 
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the President to quietly rescind his suspension of Gulf Coast drilling.254 The 
Fund also served as the centerpiece of BP’s public relations campaign in the 
years that followed, a sign—it proclaimed—of its corporate responsibility. 
For claimants, the GCCF promised a quick payment to stem any 
consequential losses, particularly for those who had the most substantial 
harms. The Fund gave claimants the ability to select the most advantageous 
system as among a number of options, including the choice of flat-rate 
payment ($5,000 for an individual or $25,000 for a company), individualized 
interim quarterly payments based upon proof of ongoing losses, or an 
individualized one-time payout of all damages.255 These rapid payments were 
beneficial to other stakeholder groups, from governments to businesses, 
concerned with the secondary effects of the direct job losses and property 
damage created by the spill. 
Yet, despite the clear ability for a superior payout structure that avoided the 
costs and delay of aggregation, benefiting all parties, the privatized nature of 
the GCCF raised strong questions about its legitimacy. While many agree that 
Feinberg was selected as the administrator because of his unparalleled 
experience, including as the special master of the September 11th Fund,256 
many raised questions about whether his judgments favored BP. Critics 
pointed to the lack of public notice and comment period on the GCCF 
structure,257 inconsistent awards and the failure to create transparent payment-
calculation frameworks,258 and attempts to impose geographic restrictions and 
collateral source rules that deviated from the available legal remedies.259 Also 
subject to criticism was the ultimate determination that the GCCF had 
systematically underpaid claimants relative to the payouts the Department of 
Justice determined to be properly owing—albeit by only one percent.260 
As these questions swirled, many chose to participate in the GCCF 
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payout of approximately the amount owing, without the need to bear attorneys’ 
fees or other expenses, and thus offered a superior net payout. Others openly 
opposed the regime as a private, unilateral offer lacking transparency and 
legitimacy and filed class action litigation against BP, which was brought into 
the MDL.262 Many took no action at all, for reasons that we will likely never 
discern with certainty beyond scattered anecdotes. 
On December 21, 2012, the presiding judge in the Deepwater Horizon 
MDL, U.S. District Court Judge Carl Barbier, granted final approval to a class 
settlement addressing medical and economic damages claims.263 The court’s 
order resulted in the immediate freezing of payouts by the GCCF, even to 
individuals who were negotiating individual settlements with the aid of 
counsel.264 This freezing resulted in part from the court’s order that claimants 
who had reached direct settlements with the GCCF, without the assistance of 
class counsel and in some cases with their own lawyers, would nevertheless be 
required to pay six percent of their awards to the MDL plaintiffs’ steering 
committee—underscoring the expense of aggregation relative to the 
disaggregative process.265 
What was the value added from the aggregation? The biggest benefit thus 
far seems to have been enhanced legitimacy, as the court approved the 
settlement’s terms and the selection of a claims administrator. Yet, beyond this 
shift at the top, the class settlement substantially paralleled the GCCF. The 
disaggregative Fund’s administrator had paid more than $6.2 billion to those 
who had submitted claims,266 working with Garden City Group and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers as subcontractors in the claims administration 
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expected to pay out $7.8 billion to those individuals who chose not to file with 
the GCCF but now choose to file claims, working with Garden City Group and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers as subcontractors in the claims administration 
process.268 The programs are thus substantially similar on their face, offering 
full compensation for those who affirmatively file claims—although the 
aggregate settlement will preclude future litigation for those who missed the 
January 22, 2013 claims deadline, in contrast to the disaggregative system, 
which allowed nonparticipants to retain their claims. 
At what cost was this legitimacy obtained? Despite BP’s demonstrated 
willingness to settle claims through the GCCF, the fees resulting from the 
aggregate proceeding were massive: the court approved an interim payment of 
$75 million to class counsel, with an overall cap of $600 million in fees, costs, 
and expenses.269 Moreover, as noted above, Judge Barbier sought to charge 
GCCF participants for the costs of this representation—despite objections that 
these disaggregative settlement participants received no benefit from the class 
action, as their settlement terms were those of the GCCF and not modified by 
the work of class counsel or the plaintiff’s steering committee in the MDL.270 
The lack of legitimacy and transparency is not just harming the parties or 
society, from the perspective of social justice. Rather, it is having trickle-down 
effects, creating dysfunction in the compensation paid in disaggregative 
systems. Yet aggregation’s delays and costs are so great that the over half a 
million claimants who filed claims with the GCCF and BP both were willing to 
bear dislocations in compensation, rather than litigate.271 This suggests that 
both sides concluded that the risk of improper compensation was less than the 
benefit obtained from a disaggregative dispute resolution mechanism. 
Against this backdrop, it seems there must be a better way to obtain the 
benefits of disaggregation without the legitimacy challenges of privatization 
nor the costs imposed by the current backstop of aggregation. The rest of this 
colloquy begins to address this question, exploring the potential for the use of 
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disaggregation, while ensuring that the public interest in deterrence and law 
enforcement is satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article documents the birth of an entirely new branch of mass claims 
resolution mechanisms—radically upending the traditional view that 
aggregation was the only way to resolve mass claims. Just as class actions 
were once in their infancy, so now is disaggregation. Disaggregation is an 
emerging trend that is gaining momentum, and for good reason—both 
claimants and defendants can receive better outcomes and far faster than in 
aggregate litigation. Yet, as this Article has detailed, purely privatized 
disaggregation is imperfect, creating a risk of suboptimal outcomes for not 
only the parties, but for our broader, normative goals. 
This Article therefore offers a call to a new line of scholarship exploring 
the ways in which these new private ordering mechanisms are changing not 
only our conceptualization and use of aggregate procedure but also the 
enforcement of substantive law and the nature of the private right of action. In 
the wake of this transformation, what is the right approach? Should we move 
toward increasing use of quasi-administrative actions?272 Should we draft laws 
with increased qui tam rights, or create enhanced private penalties mirroring 
those of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.?273 Or is 
it time to reform our private mass compensation schemes?274 
As I indicated at the outset, my goal is not to answer these questions. 
Rather it is to identify this new branch of disaggregative mechanisms, 
beginning the conversation about how their existence has informed the 
viability of aggregation and, in turn, how the availability of aggregate 
mechanisms has shaped the adoption of disaggregative mechanisms. In 
beginning this discussion, I argue we must stop seeing aggregation as a 
mandatory mechanism and instead recognize the complex feedback loop 
operating between the default world of public aggregation mechanisms and the 
strategic choices it incentivizes as parties take their first steps into this new 
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